En anderledes fattigdom
Posted: October 4, 2009 Filed under: China, development, poverty | Tags: China, development, poverty, welfare system Leave a comment »
De økonomiske reformer udrydder en del af landets fattigdom, men skaber samtidig nye grupper af fattige.
Af Kjeld A. Larsen
‘Kinas fremskridt hvad angår reduktion af fattigdom gennem de seneste 25 år er misundelsesværdig’. Således indleder Verdensbanken sin seneste fattigdomsdomsrapport om Kina fra marts 2009: From poor areas to poor people: China’s evolving poverty reduction agenda. Resultaterne har været store, men samtidig er der stor uenighed om, hvor mange der har undsluppet fattigdommen, og hvilke befolkningsgrupper der fortsat befinder sig i fattigdom.
Individualiseret fattigdom
I form af en beskeden velfærdsfond finansieret via den kollektive produktion havde landsbyernes bønder i folkekommunsystemet før 1979 adgang til en seksårig grunduddannelse og et kooperativt sundhedssystem. Som et resultat af det forebyggende sundhedssystem er kinesernes middellevetid i perioden før 1979 steget mere end nogensinde, fra 35 år i 1949 til 68 år i 1978.
Med folkekommunernes opløsning fra begyndelsen af 1980erne forsvandt den kollektive velfærdsfond, og nye grupper af fattige er opstået, også uden for de traditionelt fattige områder. Familier med lav indkomst tager børnene ud af skolen, fordi de indførte skolepenge tynger budgettet, og/eller fordi de voksne skønner, at nytten som medproducent hjemme vejer tungere end tillærte kundskaber fra skolegangen. Med det kooperative sundhedssystems opløsning er sygdomsbehandling og medicin blevet en så bekostelig affære, at de kommercielle tilbud ikke benyttes eller ved benyttelse skubber familien ud i fattigdom. De familier, som ikke kan klare sig på de markedsøkonomiske vilkår i mere velstillede områder, er ofte karakteriseret ved stor forsørgerbyrde, manglende unge arbejdsdygtige i familien, handicappede eller syge familiemedlemmer. Dertil er kommet tre nye grupper af fattige: jordløse, ældre og forældreløse eller forladte børn.
Som resultat af urbanisering og infrastrukturudbygning har et stigende antal bønder, skønsmæssigt 40-50 mio i 2005, mistet deres jord via ekspropriation. Ifølge en national undersøgelse har godt halvdelen fået lokalt arbejde, ca ¼ er blevet migrantarbejdere, men ca 20% er forblevet uden arbejde og indkomst.
Den unge generation har ifølge kongfuziansk tradition – og ifølge nugældende kinesisk lov – ansvar for at tage sig af sine ældre. Men den omfattende migration har skubbet forsørgerpligten i baggrunden: de fleste ældre bor alene og modtager kun et beskedent økonomisk beløb af deres børn til livets opretholdelse. Og pensionsforsikring, som er begyndt at blive opbygget i velstillede landsbyer, er totalt fraværende i fattige områder. Der er mange parallelle skøn over antallet af fattige ældre. Ifølge en af kilderne udgør de fattige ældre 25-31 pct. af de absolut fattige på landet, sammenlignet med 10-14 pct. blandt byernes fattige.
Fattigdommens regionale fordeling
I kort form karakteriseres Kinas fattige områder ved fire kinesiske skrifttegn: shan (bjerg), lao (gammel), bian (grænse) og shao (minoritet). Det er således karakteristisk, at fattigdommen er koncentreret til bjergområder og til gamle revolutionære baseområder, hvor den kinesiske revolution tog sit udspring i slutningen af 1920-erne og i 1930-erne. Desuden langs den internationale grænse mod vest, men også i grænseområder mellem provinserne. Og endelig i områder, som bebos af nationale mindretal. Flere af disse karakteristikker er sammenfaldende. I slutningen af de store kollektivers tid var fattigdommen et udbredt fænomen i Kinas landdistrikter. Det kollektive landbrugs store problem var, at en stigning i arbejdsproduktiviteten udeblev, bl.a. som følge af den manglende udviklingsvej: migration til byerne. Den udeblevne produktivitetsudvikling hindrede en vækst i den individuelle indkomst. Dertil kom, at selve udviklingsstrategien i nogle områder havde bidraget til at skabe fattigdom.
Strategier til bekæmpelse af fattigdom har ændret sig gennem Folkerepublikkens historie, parallelt med overordnede udviklingsstrategier og syn på årsager til fattigdommens fremkomst. Overordnet kan der skelnes mellem fire strategiperioder.
Til trods for det store fald i antallet af absolut fattige siden starten af 1980erne har faldet været ujævnt. I virkeligheden fandt det største fald sted i perioden forud for igangsættelse af en egentlig fattigdomsstrategi i 1986. En væsentlig årsag til den stigende landbrugsproduktion indtil 1984 var overgangen til individuel produktion, som i starten især kom de dårligt fungerende kollektiver i fattige områder til gode, kombineret med forhøjede statslige opkøbspriser på landbrugsprodukter.
Der er flere væsentlige årsager til fremkomsten af fattigdom blandt byboerne. Arbejderklassen var den mest privilegerede klasse under det planøkonomiske system. Sikkerhed og velfærdsgoder blev sikret via arbejdspladsen, de statsejede virksomheder (danwei): livsvarig jobsikring, beskeden husleje, adgang til gratis uddannelse og sundhedstjeneste og pension. Systemet blev siden hen forsynet med den negative betegnelse ‘jernrisgryden’, dvs. som et system der skaber beskedne incitamenter til produktivitetsforøgelse. Med de dramatiske strukturændringer fra midt-1990erne ændredes de statslige virksomheders privilegerede position, og arbejderklassens privilegier blev fjernet. Under en markedsøkonomi kan virksomheder med så store sociale forpligtelser i forhold til arbejdsstyrken ikke klare sig, men tvinges til at slanke sine ansvarsområder, dvs. fjerne de sociale fordele for arbejdsstyrken.
Utilfredsheden i arbejderklassen sporedes allerede samtidig med studenterdemonstrationerne i 1989, hvor inflation udhulede reallønnen, men den udbredte utilfredshed bredte sig med de store ændringer i ejerstrukturen fra 1994. Beskæftigelsen inden for den statsejede sektor, som faktisk steg mellem 1990 og 1994, faldt med 31,5 mio jobs fra 1994 til 2006, hvilket svarer til 15 pct. af arbejdsstyrken i byerne. I den samme periode mistede den kollektive sektor 16,5 mio jobs. Samlet faldt beskæftigelsen i den statslige og kollektive sektor fra 76 pct. i 1995 til 25 pct. i 2006. Udviklingen fik alvorlige konsekvenser: faldende beskæftigelsesrate, specielt for kvinder og især fra 1999 til 2003, et fald fra 73 til 63 pct., voksende arbejdsløshed, større vægt på uformel beskæftigelse, også i den statslig sektor, manglende løn- og pensionsudbetalinger.
Via uformel ansættelse i modsætning til kontraktansættelse kan arbejdsgiveren for det meste undgå at betale bidrag til pension, arbejdsløshed, sundhed, og arbejdsskader, alle de goder som arbejderklassens tidligere nød godt af. Alt i alt manglende sikkerhed i ansættelsen, forringet arbejdsmiljø og endelig stigende konkurrence på arbejdsmarkedet fra den stærkt voksende migrantarbejdsstyrke.
Udviklingen afspejler sig i et voksende antal midlertidigt afskedigede med fortsat tilknytning til en arbejdsplads, arbejdsløse, og et stigende antal unge færdiguddannede fra universiteterne, som ikke kan finde job på et trængt arbejdsmarked.
Siden midt-1990erne er der indført en række forsikringsprogrammer for byens lønarbejdere: pensions-, sundheds-, arbejdsløsheds-, arbejdsskades- og barselsforsikring. I 2007 var henholdsvis 52, 46, 40, 42 og 70 pct. af byernes beskæftigede
dækket af omtalte forsikringsprogrammer. Men byernes migrantarbejdere, som fortsat har en registerstatus i landsbyerne, er dækket i langt mindre grad.
Fattigdom blandt migrantarbejdere
I takt med landbrugets produktivitetsudvikling og Kinas inddragelse i den globale arbejdsdeling er en stadig stigende andel af arbejdsstyrken fra landdistrikterne vandret mod byerne for at få lønarbejde. Hovedparten har fået arbejde uden for deres amt, for det meste i storbyer i de velstillede kystprovinser. Det skønnes, at afvandringen til destinationer uden for hjemamtet steg fra 84 mio. i 2001 til 140 mio i 2008.
Migrantarbejderne registreres fortsat som værende en del af landbefolkningen. De udgør en inkluderet bestanddel af byernes arbejdsmarked, men er i øvrigt socialt ekskluderet, dvs. at de har kun i begrænset omfang adgang til samme velfærdsprogrammer som de lokale arbejdere med registerstatus i byerne.
Migrantarbejdere er endnu ikke blevet talt med som fattige i den officielle statistik over landdistrikternes fattige. Dette kan skyldes to forhold: dels deres ringe repræsentation i de årlige statistikundersøgelser, dels den lave fattigdomsgrænse. Migrantarbejdernes lønninger er generelt højere end indkomsten på landet, men lavere end de lokale arbejderes lønninger. Men da leveomkostningerne er højere i byen, burde der udregnes en højere fattigdomsgrænse for migrantarbejderne sammenlignet med fattigdomsgrænsen på landet.
I de seneste år har myndighederne påbegyndt en inklusion af migrantarbejderne i bybefolkningens sociale forsikringsprogrammer, især i arbejdsskades- og sundhedsforsikringsprogrammet, med henholdsvis 49,4 mio. og 42,7 mio. i 2008, mindst i pensions- og arbejdsløshedsforsikringsprogrammet (24,2 mio. og 15,5 mio.). Netop de to sidstnævnte programmer er skruet sådan sammen, at de ikke kan betjene en så mobile arbejdsstyrke, som migrantarbejderne udgør.
Den globale finansielle krise har skabt økonomisk krise i Kina: mange eksportbaserede virksomheder i kystprovinsernes byer har måttet indskrænke eller lukke. Krisen har specielt berørt migrantarbejdernes situation. Det officielle nyhedsbureau Xinhua meddelte i slutningen af marts 2009, at 70 mio. af de 140 mio. migrantarbejdere rejste hjem for at fejre kinesisk nytår. Af disse var kun 56 mio. vendt tilbage til byerne, og heraf havde 45 mio. fundet arbejde, mens 11 mio. fortsat stod uden arbejde. En hel del af de tilbageblevne på landet er sandsynligvis blevet fristet af centralregeringens nye subsidiepolitik rettet mod landdistrikterne og vil forsøge at bidrage til udviklingen lokalt, mens en del af de 11 mio. migrantarbejdere i byerne uden job vil være at tælle blandt Kinas fattige i 2009.
Win win?
Generelt bliver Kinas migrationspolitik betegnet som en win-win situation: produktion og indkomst øges, migrantarbejderne sender penge hjem til familierne i landsbyerne, og forbrugerne i Vesten forsynes med billige forbrugsvarer. Men udviklingen har sociale slagskygger. Migrantarbejderne kommer først og fremmest fra mellemindkomstfamilier. De velstillede har skabt arbejde og indkomst lokalt, men de fattige har hverken tilstrækkelige midler eller det nødvendige netværk til at sende familiemedlemmer afsted. Da migrantarbejderne hører til blandt de fysisk stærke og bedst uddannede, betyder afvandringen et braindrain for landsbyen. Analyser peger på, at tabet af hovedsageligt unge velkvalificerede mænd fører til demografisk skævhed i Kinas landsbyer: omkring 47 mio efterladte kvinder, 20 mio efterladte børn og 18 mio efterladte ældre over 60 år. Emotionelle forstyrrelser blandt opvoksende ‘forældreløse’ børn, afsavn blandt voksne kvinder og omsorgssvigt over for ældre er bagsiden af de begunstigedes win-win situation.
Ændrede klasserelationer
De økonomiske reformer har i den grad skabt ændringer i magt- og klasserelationerne i Kina. Indtroduktionen af kapitalistiske markedsrelationer førte til en opløsning af planøkonomiens økonomiske institutioner og dertil knyttede sociale sikkerheds- og velfærdsgoder. Den nuværende mere komplekse klassestruktur er bestemt af en alliance mellem Kommunistpartiet (KKP), de statsejede virksomheders ledere, repræsentanter for multinatinale virksomheder, det ny borgerskab bestående af entreprenante kapitalister, hovedparten af de intellektuelle, alt i alt en alliance som skaber grundlag for en priviligeret voksende middelklasse med store forbrugsmuligheder, og en alliance som bl.a. bygger på migrantarbejdernes bidrag til den nødvendige kapitalakkumulation. Kapitalister fik mulighed for optagelse i KKP fra 2002 under den forrige partileder Jiang Zemin. Det er næppe fra denne bærende klassealliance med dens store privilegier, at kravet om demokratiske reformer vil komme.
De store økonomiske og sociale ændringer har bidraget til ændringen af fattigdomsstrukturen: fra områdebaseret fattigdom på landet til individualiseret fattigdom i både land og by og med basis i de sociale grupper, som har tabt terræn i udviklingsprocessen: en del af bondebefolkningen, herunder migrantarbejdere, og de statsejede virksomheders arbejdere.
Den resulterende sociale uro har været drivkraften bag regeringens større vægt på regional og social lighed fra omkring 2000 og specielt den hurtige gennemførelse af de mange sikkerheds- og velfærdsprogrammer siden 2005. Klassekampsparolen under Mao er blevet erstattet af den kongfuziansk inspirerede parole ‘harmonisk samfund’ med en begyndende velstand for alle under den nuværende partileder Hu Jintao.
Flere forskningsinstitutioner har foretaget beregninger over, hvad det vil koste den kinesiske stat at gennemføre social velstand for alle på et rimeligt velstandsniveau, herunder en begyndende ligestilling af by og land, hvor den nuværende registerstatus land og by er ophævet. Ifølge officielle beregninger vil regeringens mål at opnå et nationalt velfærdssystem i 2020 kræve en forøgelse af det sociale budget fra 1.660 mia yuan i 2008 til 5.740 mia yuan i 2020, hvilket vil betyde, at de sociale velfærdsydelser som andel af statens samlede finansielle indtægter (centralt og lokalt) skal stige fra de nuværende 27 pct. til 35 pct., bestemt ikke en uopnåelig målsætning.
Med gennemførelsen af de sociale programmer vil det ganske givet lykkes for KKP at cementere sit nye legitimitetsgrundlag: begyndende velstand for alle uanset klasseinteresser og dermed bygge videre på det klassiske kejserdynastis selvopfattelse: staten der hævet over klassemodsætninger udøver retfærdighed ved at løse opstående konflikter mellem samfundets bærende sociale grupper.
Table 2: Dibao persons and government dibao expenditures
Kjeld A. Larsen er geograf og har i mange år forsket i Kinas fattigdomsproblemer.
Some thoughts about the background to the recent events in Urumchi from a sociolinguist’s point of view
Posted: July 13, 2009 Filed under: China, minorities, poverty, terrorism, Xinjiang | Tags: China, Ethnic minorities, Human rights, minorities, political movements, poverty, security policy, terrorism, Xinjiang Leave a comment »Joakim Enwall Associate Professor Chinese Language and Culture Department of Linguistics and Philology Uppsala University
July 12, 2009
Introduction
The history of Xinjiang is characterised by its position as a transit area for peoples, languages, arts, religions and commercial products. Drastic changes have occurred at many times in its history, as one constellation of the above-mentioned factors has superseded another, but most of these processes of change have been relatively drawn out, often occurring in a time span of several hundred years. Although China has had strong influence in the area since the centuries preceding the Common Era, at least during quite long periods, it is only after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China that this influence has manifested itself in a massive immigration of Han Chinese into the area.
Historical and political overview
In the last years of the 18th century the Eastern Turkestan area was incorporated into the Qing Empire under the name of Xinjiang or “New Dominion”. This was part of a policy of expanding the empire to the areas, which had at some point in history been part of China. The notion of being part of the Middle Kingdom was, however, rather vague, and referred both to areas having been under tight Chinese political and economic control and to former tributary states. Qing officials or ambans were instituted in Xinjiang, and by use of military force the Chinese managed to keep the area as a part of China in spite of several severe cases of rebellion against the Chinese rulers. During the last decades of the 19th century the surrounding powers, Great Britain in India and Russia, initiated political manipulations to increase their respective influence in the area, a process which later became known as the Great Game. The Chinese Empire was getting weaker and the Russian interests temporarily gained the upper hand in Xinjiang.
The linguistic situation around 1900
In the Qing administration there were two official languages, Manchu and Chinese, but Xinjiang was not an area well integrated into the ordinary administrative structure. It was more of a strategic colonial rule, like in Tibet, and the linguistic policies of the empire had but peripheral influence on the majority of the population. In the same way as in most parts of Central Asia, Persian was a widespread language both in the field of administration, in commerce and in literature, and in the religious sphere Arabic played an important rule. Uyghur – at that time not yet defined as Uyghur – was, however, the sole language of communication for the vast majority of the population.
During the first decades of the 20th century the bulk of the literature in Uyghur consisted of hand copied manuscripts and a few lithographed books, produced in Tashkent, Samarkand and Bukhara. Apart from works related to Islam and moral themes, there was a great number of romantic and heroic tales, often modelled on Persian originals (Jarring 1979). Only a minority of the population was literate, but there was also a strong tradition of oral literature, which before 1949 was passed on from generation to generation. Nowadays, this tradition is virtually extinct.
The Uyghur revival
The traditional way for a person later defined as an Uyghur to define himself was “Turk” or, alternatively, as originating from one of the major oases “qäshqärliq”, “khotänlik” or “turpanlik”. At a conference held in the 1920s in Almaty it was decided that the term Uyghur be reintroduced for designating the people believed to be the offspring of the Uyghurs who established their empire in western Mongolia in the 8th century. This usage spread to Xinjiang in the 1930s.
The orthography was standardised by Mr. G. Ahlbert of the Swedish Mission Press in his spellingbook for the language of the six cities, published by the Swedish Mission Press in Kashgar in 1929. A few years later the strict orthographic principles and particularly the rules for spelling Arabic loanwords as well as the ways of rendering the Uyghur vowels varied considerably between the authors and publishers of Uyghur language texts.
The demographic changes 1950-1980
According to the census of 1953, two years after Xinjiang was incorporated into the People’s Republic, the number of Uyghurs was 3.6 million, the Han Chinese numbered 300.000 and the other ethnic groups approximately 930.000, of which the Kazak constituted two thirds. For many of the Kazak and Kirghiz, Uyghur was the lingua franca, and it may well be concluded that the use of Chinese was limited to provincial administration and military affairs. Other contacts, including commercial and technical, had been more focused on the Soviet Union than on China proper, and this is clearly reflected in the amount of Russian loanwords in Uyghur as compared to that of Chinese loanwords.
Starting in the early 1950s, large groups of Chinese farmers, demobilised military personnel and intellectuals were sent to Xinjiang in order to construct the new society. The peasants and former soldiers were organised in the bingtuan-system, or para-military colonies, which reminds of the tuntian-system, introduced to Xinjiang by the Chinese 2000 years earlier. These bingtuan-units were established as self-sustaining militia groups around the Taklamakan desert, and apart from being in charge of developing cotton farming by using the water of the Tarim River for irrigation, they were also to serve as a deterring force against possible rebellions among the minority population. Large groups of military personnel were sent into the area, especially after the break up between China and the Soviet Union, and many of them stayed on after their military tasks were completed. The third group, the intellectuals, took charge of the authorities and the schools, and thereby exerted a large impact on the cultural development of Xinjiang. During the Cultural Revolution, red guards entered the area and began propagating the new rules for societal life, which included drastic changes as an imposed pig raising policy for the Muslims. The results of this immigration can be seen in the 1982 census. The number of Uyghurs had increased to 5.9 million, an increase of 63%, while the Han Chinese population reached 5.3 million, thus an increase of 1660% in 29 years. The other ethnic groups showed an increase of some 96%, amounting to a total of approximately 1.8 million in 1982. This process has since then slowed down in percentages, but not in actual numbers of people. A further complicating factor is the large group of retired intellectuals, consisting both of those who were originally sent in the 1950s for developing the area, and of those exiled after the anti-Rightist campaign of 1958 and during the Cultural Revolution. After 1979 many of these chose the option to return to China proper, and also in some cases to resume their original positions at institutions of higher learning and in administration. At the same time, in connection with the abolishment of the People’s Communes and the reorganisation of state enterprises, huge groups of young people became out of work, and some of these found their way to Xinjiang.
Early Chinese minority language policies
Due to the semi-independent status of Xinjiang from the fall of the Qing dynasty until the establishment of the People’s Republic of China minority language policies was not a major concern of the Chinese authorities in Xinjiang. It was more of a struggle for keeping the province within the country and not allowing either the British or the Russians t
o take over. After 1949 the Chinese communists rapidly brought Xinjiang back into the central administration, after it had been semi-independent under the rule of Chinese governors since 1911.
Since the beginning of the 1950s small scale experiments with Cyrillic-based script for the minorities in Xinjiang were carried out. In the Soviet Union the larger ethnic minority groups of Xinjiang were also represented, including the Uyghurs, and in the 1940s Cyrillic-based orthographies for these languages had been devised. The use of Cyrillic in Xinjiang would as well facilitate cross-border contacts within these ethnic groups, but with the deteriorating atmosphere between China and the Soviet Union, such contacts were no longer seen a desirable, but as harmful. In 1958 the Committee for Writing Reform was set up and in 1959 a proposal was put forward. The minority language authorities launched a Latin-based system for Uyghur with 33 letters. Its origins are, however, to be sought in the pre-1958 minority language work, as the orthography contains letters and diacritics which are not present in the 1958 version of the Hanyu Pinyin scheme. Starting from the early 1950s, hundreds of scholars and field-workers had been engaged in a huge project of devising and reforming the writing systems of the ethnic minority groups in China. During the first years of this work, no strict common principles were applied for the choice of possible graphemes, and several proposed orthographies for various languages contained both Latin letters, Cyrillic letters and newly invented graphemes. The latter were mainly borrowed from the Latin-based orthographies used for minority languages in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s. In 1958 the People’s Congress of China approved the Hanyu Pinyin Scheme as the official transcription system for Chinese, and consequently the orthographies for minority language should follow the same spelling principles and contain the same graphemes. However, for Uyghur no such change was carried out and Arabic writing remained in use until the mid-1960s, when the Latin-based yengi yezik was introduced.
In 1958, the anti-Rightist campaign was launched, and as minority languages were generally considered a bourgeois remnant in the Chinese society, most of the work which had been carried out in the 1950s was seen as useless at best, and many collections of folk literature were destroyed. Evening courses for making the peasants literate in their own language were also cancelled. From 1958-1962 between 60,000 and 120,000 Uyghurs fled from Xinjiang to the Soviet Union. After the famine of the early 1960s a few years of relative stability followed, and during this time a few publications in Uyghur appeared. In 1966, however, the Cultural Revolution was launched, and most of the minority intellectuals who had survived the establishment of the People’s Republic and the anti-Rightist campaign, were then purged. Unlike many minority languages, the Uyghur language had been kept as an official language in Xinjiang, although only few publications appeared during the years of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Minority languages were used almost exclusively for printing translations of works by Chairman Mao and other political publications.
At school, however, both the Arabic script and the yengi yezik were used in parallel, but in 1976 the Revolutionary Committee of Xinjiang decided to make the yengi yezik the only official script for Uyghur. According to information received by Gunnar Jarring in 1978, over half of the population used the yengi yezik at that time, and all official publications appeared in that script (Jarring 1979). Although this new orthography never received wide-spread support it was taught at school until the mid-80s, and it is still used in some publications as an “auxiliary transcription system”, a face saving device of the Chinese authorities. After the reintroduction of the Perso-Arabic script what resulted from the experiment with yengi yezik was virtually a whole lost generation for literacy in Uyghur, as only a part of those who learnt yengi yezik at school later learnt the Perso-Arabic script.
Socio-economic changes after 1980
The political reforms of the early 1980s were followed by radical economic reforms in the mid-80s. Earlier redistribution systems were abolished according to the policy that some areas should become rich first and thereby trigger economic development in the poorer areas. The immediate consequence was an increasing poverty in the areas situated far away from the coast and the big cities, and Xinjiang was one of the regions worst hit by this reform. The local authorities dealing with minority language works were supposed to finance their activities on local revenue, which was scarce or non-existent.
At the same time, the petroleum industry in Xinjiang developed rapidly and this lead to an influx of Chinese workers for the oil wells in the Taklamakan desert. As the oil companies had no trust in the Uyghur population they exclusively employed Han Chinese from the Inland provinces. With increasing unemployment in China a so-called floating, i.e. unregistered, population appeared, and at present its size is estimated to over 150 million. Some of these have sought luck in China’s minority areas, including Xinjiang, and after the resettlement program in connection with the Three Gorges Project, the number of Han Chinese coming to Xinjiang is on the raise. They settle mainly in the Bayangol prefecture, the Urumchi area, and in Dzungaria.
Revival of minority language work
After the third plenary session of the 11th Party Congress in 1979, the former minority policies in China were to be revived, much according to the principles of the early- and mid-1950s.
In 1984 the Arabic-script-based system was reintroduced, and after the orthographic reforms of 1985 it remains unchanged to this day.
The influence of Russian is still very much present in Uyghur and from the principles of coining new words it can be seen that the loanwords from Russian have been well integrated into Uyghur.
Tightening up – new policies after 1994
In the 1980s the Chinese way of living gained ground in Xinjiang and in cities like Urumchi, Kashgar and Khotan typical phenomena of Chinese society like pop music, Karaoke bars, beer drinking and a focus on making money had a heavy impact on the lives of young Uyghurs. There was also an increased interest in mastering the Chinese language, which was a necessary tool for gaining access to the new cultural and societal phenomena. This inevitably led to a clash with traditional values of the Uyghur society, but many older people also saw this as an inevitable consequence of modernity. Nonetheless, since the mid-80s, some radical Islamist groups were formed, and some even went for military training in Afghanistan. Upon their return they initiated sabotage activities and even outright rebellions, albeit on a small scale. Nonetheless, the support for these activities seems to have been quite small among Uyghurs in general. As the Chinese state reacted to these terrorist activities, their measures were over-dimensioned for the purposes they wanted to achieve. After the meeting of the Ethnic Affairs Commission in December 1994, measures like closing down madrasas and strict control of Friday prayer contents made the general opinion shift. The young people who had earlier wholeheartedly embraced the Chinese culture turned to Islam, stopped frequenting Chinese bars and dance halls and started attending the prayers in the mosques. On this, the Chinese reacted with even stronger measures against Islam, and the gap between the two halves of the population was further widened.
Many educated Chinese do not any more feel safe in the area, and as
they can usually get work in China proper they leave the area. This, however, does not lead to a decrease of the Chinese population, as their numbers are well compensated through the influx of non-educated Chinese, who cannot find jobs in China proper.
The response of the Uyghur intellectuals has more often than not been a reinterpretation of the history of Xinjiang (Gladney, 1998). The Uyghurs are seen as the original inhabitants of the area as early as the first centuries BC and as little knowledge about the ancient ethnic setting is available in contemporary Xinjiang, this myth spreads unchallenged. It has also made the local authorities more sensitive about research on the pre-Uyghur ethnic groups of Xinjiang, as the findings could “lead to ethnic contradictions” (yinqi minzu maodun). As long as the present ethnic setting is not challenged, the authorities generally tolerate publications in this field. Sometimes, however, the local government has prohibited historical works in this genre, as for example the famous three books “üch kitap” by Torghun Almas, which were actually published during the years of relative opening up prior to 1989, but later collected and burnt. These books dealt with Uyghur history, Uyghur literature and the history of the Huns respectively. After the prohibition all Uyghur intellectuals were urged to criticise these books in articles in Uyghur newspapers and journals in order to reach the Uyghur readers as well.
The publication activities in Uyghur have, however, increased during the 1990s, though only in the field of strictly controlled works. Apart from the Uyghur Publishing House in Kashgar, books in Uyghur are published by nine publishing houses in Xinjiang as well as by the Nationalities Publishing House in Peking. The total number of titles in Uyghur for the year 1998 was approximately 700 according to the provincial authorities, but at the Uyghur Publishing House in Kashgar the number 876 was given for that publishing house only, with an average edition of 5000. Out of these 70% were original works in Uyghur and 30% translations, mainly from Chinese.
In higher education, this is even more evident, where only few subjects, like the minority language itself, and the minority literature itself are taught in the minority language. The system of schooling of ethnic minority children outside the autonomous regions was introduced in 1987, with the Beijing Tibet High School. The students are recruited mainly from poor families and the students are given the preferential treatment of free high school education. A similar system with schools in twelve Chinese cities for Uyghur children was established in 1997. This kind of system has earlier proven most efficient in training cadres on higher level at the Central Institute for Nationalities (now renamed Central University of Nationalities) in Beijing. Interesting historical parallels are also to be found in the devshirme system for the dhimmi groups in Ottoman times and in the special boarding schools for American Indians in the US and for the Saami in Sweden.
Since the establishment of the Xinjiang classes, the number has increased from 12 to 27, and the total enrolment is over 5000 (Xinjiang ribao wang, 2007-02-14). For the future development, there are plans to enlarge the number of bilingual preschools, and the target is set at 258,000 Xinjiang ethnic minority preschoolers in 2010 (Renmin ribao haiwaiban: 2006-10-12). A further result is that the Uyghur teachers also have to pass exams in Chinese in order to keep their employment at the schools (Xinjiang ribao wang: 2006-07-11).
Concluding remarks
The present situation is characterised by an intensified conflict and a societal division between Han Chinese and Uyghurs, which in many ways reminds of a traditional colonial setting, and which contains many political complications. Unless a significant change is brought about regarding the economic, religious and cultural conditions of the Uyghurs, this tense situation is not likely to change, and hard-core groups will probably gain further support among the Uyghur population. The recent events show that the situation is already on the point of boiling over and it seems unlikely the measures implemented by the authorities will decrease the tension between the two major population groups, the Uyghurs and the Han Chinese, in Xinjiang.
References
Dillon, Michael. 1995. Xinjiang: Ethnicity, Separatism and Control in Chinese Central Asia. Durham East Asian papers, 1. Durham: Department of East Asian Studies, University of Durham.
Dreyer, June Teufel. 1976. China‘s Forty Millions: Minority Nationalities and National Integration in the People’s Republic of China. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Enwall, Joakim. 1999. “Towards a Sociolinguistic History of Sinkiang”. Return to the Silk Routes: Current Scandinavian Research on Central Asia. Edited by Mirja Juntunen & Birgit N. Schlyter. London: Kegan Paul International, pp. 119-131.
Gladney, Dru S. 1998. “Internal Colonialism and the Uyghur Nationality: Chinese Nationalism and its Subaltern Subjects”. Cemoti – Cahiers d’études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le Monde Turco-iranien, no 25, pp. 47-63.
Jarring, Gunnar. 1979. Åter till Kashgar: Memoarer i nuet. Stockholm: Bonniers.
—-. 1991. Prints from Kashghar: The Printing-office of the Swedish Mission in Eastern Turkestan. History and Production with an Attempt at a Bibliography. Stockholm: Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul. Transactions, vol. 3.
Mackerras, Colin. 1994. China’s Minorities: Integration and Modernization in the Twentieth Century. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.
Renmin ribao haiwaiban [People's Daily, Overseas Edition], 2006-10-10. “Xinjiang ‘shuangyu’ jiaoyu cong wawa zhuaqi” [Xinjiang's bilingual education starts with small children].
Rudelson, Justin Jon. 1997. Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism Along China’s Silk Road. New York: Columbia University Press.
Xinjiang ribao wang [Xinjiang Daily Net], 2006-07-11. “Atushi xingqi xue Hanyu re” [Artush excited by Chinese language studying fever].
Xinjiang ribao wang [Xinjiang Daily Net], 2007-02-14. “Xinjiang jinnian jiang you 5000 xuesheng fu neidi gaozhong jiuxue”.
Protecting the rural poor against economic consequences of major illness: a challenge for Asian transitional economies. Notes fr
Posted: October 20, 2008 Filed under: cambodia, China, health, illness, InFocus, Laos, poverty | Tags: cambodia, China, health, illness, InFocus, Laos, poverty Leave a comment »Kristina Jönsson,Ph.D, Researcher,Centre for East and South-East Asian Studies, Lund University, SwedenDespite substantial economic development and successful poverty reduction in many low- and middle-income countries in Asia, the urban-rural gap continues to widen. Many poor and near poor are becoming increasingly vulnerable to unexpected expenses, not the least illness. Illness has become an important cause of household impoverishment in countries such as China, Cambodia and Lao PDR, largely because of low levels of government health-care funding and the rising cost of medical care. However, the governments in all three countries have announced major initiative to address this problem: China in line with a “harmonious society” and Cambodia and Laos in line with poverty reduction strategies and the fulfilment of the Millennium Development Goals.
From 4 to 10 October 2008 I participated in the annual meeting of the research consortium POVILL (poverty & illness)[1] in Vientiane, Lao PDR. The purpose of POVILL is to assist the initiatives by the three governments and to and assess their performance by in-depth studies in Cambodia, Laos and two provinces in Central China. The first five days were devoted to sharing preliminary research findings among the project researchers, while the two last days were committed to a conferences open to policymakers, donor representatives, NGOs, media and other stakeholders. The discussions were intense and many lessons were shared. It was concluded that while many of the problems in three countries are similar, there are also substantial differences that must be taken into account when designing social protection programmes for the poor.
In conjunction with the conference the first larger output of the project was launched, namely the book Health and Social Protection of the Poor: Experiences from Cambodia, China and Lao PDR (can be downloaded at www.povill.com). The book addresses the challenge of applying social protection concepts to health, and explores the challenge of managing pro-poor health system development in transitional economies. The authors are scholars and policy actors from Asia, Europe and Australia from disciplines as diverse as public health, health system research, public administration, economics, political science, sociology and anthropology.
When we were not busy with meetings, we could enjoy the festivities of the up-coming boat festival Bun Nam. The event marks the end of the Buddhist rains retreat, and during the festival boat races are held on the Mekong river with teams not only from Lao PDR but also from the neighbouring countries. Although I missed the actual boat races, I could benefit from all the food stalls, temporary discos, carnival games (notably throwing darts at balloons), and beer gardens. Staying at the Lane Xang Hotel next to the Mekong River I did not even need to leave the hotel but could enjoy the festivities form my balcony. This was a very different city from the normally very quiet Vientiane I have come to know over the years.
[1] POVILL is a four year European funded international partnership of ten organisations in six countries set up to contribute to international knowledge about how to help households to cope with major illness, and to contribute to efforts to reduce severe poverty due to illness and improve access to health services (see www.povill.com).
