Nordkorea og os: Farcen at græde i kor – bag om mediedækningen

Posted on December 22, 2011 by

 Af Ida Zidore, medlem af U-landsnyt.dk’s redaktion og MA of Journalism and Media.
This article was published in Ulandsnyt.dk on Thursday 22 December 2011.

 
Nordkoreas “Kære Leder” er død. Tilsyneladende er historier om grådkvalte studieværter og Kim Jong-Ils feticher nogle af de mest interessante for de danske nyhedsmedier.

Hvis der er noget, vi danskere ikke er opdraget til, er det at tilbede despotiske ledere og totalitære systemer. Der skal være plads til det rimelige og det sandhedssøgende.

Og fremfor alt skal der være plads til det enkelte menneske.

Mediernes parodiske fremstilling af Nordkorea i disse dage trykker på nogle farlige knapper. Hvis man ikke allerede havde fordomme liggende om nordkoreanere som en flok imbecile verdensbenægtere, kan man hurtigt få dem.

Det kan undre, at farcerne får lov at dominere mediebilledet. For hvor sandhedssøgende og væsentlig er nu egentlig dén form for journalistik?

Selvom der også foreligger politiske analyser og kommentarer til lederskiftet, er vigtige elementer udeladt fra dækningen. Den nordkoreanske befolkning fremstår aldrig som andet end en identitetløs og grinagtig masse.

Det er ikke helt ufarligt. Sprog og billeder skaber distance, så farcerne får en konsekvens.

En identitetsløs flok

I mit kandidatspeciale undersøgte jeg, hvordan fjendebilleder af Nordkorea bliver skabt gennem sprogbrug i vestlige medier. Helt konkret undersøgte jeg en række lederartikler bragt i Politiken, The Guardian og The New York Times i løbet af år 2010.

I artiklerne var befolkningen stort set aldrig fremstillet som andet end identitetsløs – og derfor tenderende til ligegyldig – masse. Noget af det samme synes at have gjort sig gældende i de danske medier siden mandag.

Det er klart, at Nordkorea er et særligt tilfælde for journalister. Bare at komme ind i landet som reporter kan som bekendt være en udfordring. Men gengivelsen af de officielle nordkoreanske billeder af grædekor er stadig et valg, der ikke kun kan skyldes manglen på alternativ kildemateriale. Mange nordkoreanere lever i eksil, men kommer sjældent til orde.

Pointen er, at når de grinagtige billeder af befolkningen ikke får en modvægt, skabes distance. Set i et humanitært perspektiv er det ikke helt ligegyldigt. Distancen får nemlig konsekvenser. Kim Jong-Ils død går ind i rækken af episoder, der medvirker til et afstumpet billede af et helt land.

Ifølge FN er omkring 6 millioner mennesker i Nordkorea lige nu ramt af hungersnød. Det er måske ikke tilfældigt, at der ikke løftes mange danske øjenbryn. For hvem bekymrer sig om de, der ingen identitet har?

Den gamle “vi mod dem”

Ifølge mit speciale har distancen rødder i et sprogligt forsimplet modsætningsforhold mellem Nordkorea på den ene side og den vestlige verden på den anden.

Flere steder i lederartiklerne forekom det, at en underliggende præmis var et lighedstegn mellem ordene ‘Vesten’, ‘os’, ‘vi’ og tilmed ‘Verden’ på den ene side, og ordene ‘de’ og ‘Nordkorea’ på den anden.

Man kan vel næppe forvente, at læserne skal kunne identificere sig med andre end “vi i Verden”? Nordkorea bliver altså hurtigt en fremmet størrelse.

Der er nu ikke noget nyt i den dikotomi. Modsætningsforholdet er et sprogligt levn fra den Kolde Krig, hvor den kommunistiske blok blev portrætteret i medierne som den ‘Frie Verdens’ onde alter ego.

I det hele taget findes der adskillige historiske eksempler på, at binære modsætninger i sproget har været brugt til at skabe eller fastholde fjendebilleder.

Den græske historiker Herodot beskrev allerede omkring år 450 f.v.t. fjenden i Orienten som den direkte modsætning til den suveræne græker. Fjenden var portrætteret som irrationel, svag, tom og fremmet. Ikke langt fra det billede af Nordkorea, min analyse viste.

At præmissen stadig gør sig gældende i en tid, hvor liberale, vestlige medier hævder at være neutrale og upartiske, kan være forstemmende. Ligesom det kan være forstemmende at være vidne til den unuancerede og farceagtige dækning af Kim Jong-Ils død i disse dage.

Episoden gør det bare endnu mere aktuelt at fastholde den tåkrummende banale pointe, at det vi ser er billeder og forestillinger. Det er ikke sandheden. Der bor 23 millioner mennesker i Nordkorea.

Når fjenden bliver et umenneske

At Mission Øst er den eneste danske nødhjælpsorganisation, der uddeler mad i det sultramte land, kan være tankevækkende.

Generalsekretær Kim Hartzner har udtalt, at hungersnøden er en af verdens mest oversete katastrofer. Nordkoreanerne har desperat behov for hjælp.

Men humanitær bistand forudsætter jo helt grundlæggende en bevidsthed. Social, politisk eller økonomisk. Derfor må første skridt mod hjælp være bevidstheden om, at nordkoreanere er andet end en “ond, identitetsløse masse”.

Man danner sin egen sandhed på baggrund af det, man ser og hører. Lige siden verdens første krigskorrespondent William Howard Russell rapporterede fra Krim-krigen har journalister vidst, at vinkling betyder alt, når parterne i en konflikt kommer til orde.

Samtidig er umenneskeliggørelse via sproglig praksis helt grundlæggende for dannelsen af fjendebilleder.

I de artikler, jeg analyserede, blev Nordkorea – bevidst eller ubevidst – fremstillet som overvejende utroværdig, barbarisk, destruktiv og irrationel. Det modsatte af det ‘gode’. Menneskelighed var helt udelukket.

I disse dage kan danskerne primært se det nordkoreanske folk som en farce af et grædekor. Det er ligeså forsimplet og farligt.

Ida Zidore er uddannet MA i Journalism and Media within Globalization: the European Perspective fra Swansea University, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Danmarks Medie- og Journalisthøjskole og Aarhus Universitet. D. 15. December bestod hun sit afsluttende speciale Beyond the Enemy: North Korea and Iran in Western Newspapers.

Posted in media, politics | Leave a comment

“Freedom’s Just Another Word for Nothing Left To Lose?” – West Papua Declares its Independence, Again

Posted on November 10, 2011 by

Author: Henri Myrttinen[1]
e-mail: henrimyrttinen@gmail.com

Introduction

On October 19, 2011, in a sports field outside the Papuan provincial capital Jayapura, a solemn declaration was read, proclaiming the independence of West Papua, the restoration of its national symbols, the formation of a new government, the introduction of new national languages and of the Dutch New Guinea Guilder as the new currency.[2] The meeting, the Third Papuan Congress, was soon broken up by Indonesian security forces – with excessive violence. At the end of the afternoon three, possibly six Papuan civilians were dead, several dozen badly beaten, around 300 detained and the six leaders-to-be of the newly proclaimed state arrested, facing charges of treason. While the police remain adamant that they did no wrong and had to respond to an act of secession, the Indonesian government is under pressure from national and international human rights bodies to carry out credible investigations.

The proclamation and violent crackdown by the Indonesian security forces highlighted one of the key issues simmering beneath the surface in the two provinces which make up the western half of the world’s second largest island (the eastern half of the island being part of Papua New Guinea). It was, however, not the only issue keeping the territory in the spotlight. At the time of the Congress, one of the biggest and most sustained industrial actions in recent Indonesian history was into its fifth week at the world’s biggest gold and copper mine in Grasberg, several hundred kilometres away, with a death toll of eight people and no sign of abating.[3] Though not politically motivated, the strike has severely reduced the output at the mine, Indonesia’s largest taxpayer, and thus concentrated minds in the capital. The police, in the meantime, have been politically embarrassed by revelations of having received several million USD over the years in what the national police chief called ‘lunch money’ from PT Freeport Indonesia (PTFI), the company operating the Grasberg mine. PTFI has in the past admitted to paying the Indonesian armed forces for protection as well.

A few days later, the police chief in a restive Highlands district of Papua was shot dead in broad daylight, with a fringe group of the Free Papua Organisation (Organisasi Papua Merdeka – OPM) claiming responsibility. While the OPM, which has been waging a small-scale armed struggle for around 45 years, does not present a military threat to Indonesia, the high-profile killing was a stark reminder of the tenacity of this struggle and of the motivating factors behind it.

While these events have mostly not made the headlines in Europe, for the first time in a long time, the media and political elite in the Indonesian capital Jakarta have seriously awoken to the fact that the special autonomy packages passed a decade ago have not solved the conflicts in the two easternmost provinces of Papua and West Papua.

West Papuan villagers in Matefa village in consultation with a local NGO. (Photo by the author).

Background to the conflict, 1965-2001

A good point in time to begin with looking at the political conflict in Tanah Papua, the Land of Papua as the two Indonesian provinces of Papua and West Papua are jointly know as, is exactly 50 years to the day before the Third Papuan Congress. Though views on the exact date differ as to when the demands were actually made, a declaration was passed by the First Papuan Congress on 19 October, 1961 demanding that the territory be renamed West Papua, its inhabitants be called Papuans and new national symbols be accepted alongside the Dutch ones.[4]

The demands were made to the colonial government of Netherlands West New Guinea. The Dutch had retained control of the western part of New Guinea after acceding to the independence of the rest of its colonies in what was then termed the East Indies. The newly formed Republic of Indonesia was adamant that the territory be incorporated into the republic while the Dutch government initially insisted on holding on to the colony. By 1961, however, the winds of decolonisation were blowing strong against any remaining Dutch hopes of permanently holding on to West New Guinea.

Regardless of whether it was actually the First Papuan Congress which made these demands and the exact point in time when they were made, by 1 December, 1961, the Dutch government had accepted the demands. The territory was renamed West Papua, the new ‘Morning Star’ (Bintang Kejora) flag was flown alongside the Dutch flag outside the building of the New Guinea Council and the new Papuan national hymn, Hai Tanahku Papua, was played after the Dutch Wilhelmus anthem. Though in popular Papuan political thought, this occasion has become re-cast as the declaration of independence, this is not strictly true – independence was to occur after 10-20 years of Dutch tutelage.

The reaction of the Indonesian government was swift: President Sukarno denounced the display of Papuan national symbols and the inauguration of the Nieuw-Guinea Raad as a Dutch colonial ploy that attempted to deny Indonesia’s claims to the territory. In his Trikora (Tri Komando Rakyat – The Three Commands of the People) speech, Sukarno made the incorporation of the territory into the Republic of Indonesia one of the paramount objectives of Indonesian policy.

Though officially this was to be an effort of ‘the people,’ in practice the initial efforts consisted of unsuccessful small-scale military incursions. Where the military failed, though, diplomacy triumphed. Fearing the growing influence of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI – Partai Komunis Indonesia), the US government pressured the Netherlands to agree to a transfer of sovereignty under the auspices of the United Nations to Indonesia.

The transfer, under the auspices of the United Nations, was a long and highly contentious one, with the first instances of armed Papuan resistance against Indonesian rule emerging in 1964, events which the still-active OPM sees as its founding moment. The seven-year transition ended in 1969 with a ‘plebiscite’ by 1 025 Papuan elders hand-picked by Indonesian administrators.[5] All voted in favour, sealing the integration of the territory, which was renamed Irian Jaya, into the Indonesian Republic.

As in other ‘backward’ parts of Indonesia, the newly-installed government of General Soeharto began an ambitious project of modernisation, urbanisation and development. Apart from the opening of the Freeport gold and copper mine, this also included agricultural projects such as palm oil plantations, for which tens of thousands of ‘transmigrants’ as labour came into the territory from other parts of Indonesia. According to the official line, the ‘backward’ Papuan brothers and sisters, free now from the shackles of Dutch colonial power, were being accommodated into the development project of Suharto’s New Order and brought into the fold of the prosperous Indonesian family. There were, admittedly, some misguided elements who resisted this, but they would be either convinced by the fruits of development – or crushed.

In stark contrast to official Indonesian narratives of Tanah Papua’s integration, most local narratives are strongly shaped by what Herniawan and van den Broek (2001) call the Papuan ‘memoria passionis,’ a memory of suffering. These narratives are characterised by memories and the re-telling of stories military oppression, of torture, of murder, of sexual exploitation, of fear, of racism, of disrespect, of socio-economic marginalisation by the influx of economically more successful non-Papuans and of what is often perceived by indigenous Papuans to be a systematic campaign of attempts by the central government to destroy the Papuan nation.[6] These fears are exacerbated by widespread Papuan disquiet over the impacts of increased migration from other parts of Indonesia. As many, though not all migrants are Muslims and most, though not all Papuans are Christians, there is often a thinly-veiled fear of ‘Islamisation’ in Papuan discussions of the impacts of migration.

The fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 raised Papuan hopes of a new deal, perhaps even of a Timor-Leste style referendum on the status of the territory. The initial reaction of the Indonesian security forces to such calls was harsh, and at least several dozen Papuan demonstrators were killed on the island of Biak in July 1998 following the raising of the Morning Star flag. With Abdurrahman Wahid, aka Gus Dur taking over the Indonesian presidency in 1999, however, the stance of the central government became more conciliatory. The Morning Star flag was approved as an official Papuan ‘cultural symbol’ to be used alongside the Indonesian flag, the province was renamed Papua and President Wahid even contributed personal funds for organising the Second Papuan Congress in 2000. In 2001, the Special Autonomy (Otonomi Khusus – or Otsus) package for Papua was passed, later extended to the province of West Papua after this was controversially split off by decree of Wahid’s successor, President Megawati Soekarnoputri.

Special Autonomy and Discontent

In the roughly ten years since the passing of the Law on Special Autonomy, indigenous Papuan representation at all levels of the executive in the two provinces has increased, powers have been devolved from the central government and unprecedented sums of money have flowed to the two provinces. Nonetheless, it is often hard to find indigenous Papuans outside state administration who see Otsus as a success. Opposition to special autonomy has grown increasingly vocal and in 2010 a coalition of local civil society organisations symbolically ‘returned’ the law to the Indonesian government, deeming it a ‘total failure’ and demanding a thorough review. These calls were echoed by a wide coalition of Papuan churches in early 2011.

This discontent is fuelled by various widespread discourses: the increased influx of funds is generally seen to have only benefited a small local elite while large sections of the indigenous population continue to live in poverty; the central government has been seen as torpedoing Papuan efforts at self-governance; migration remains high stoking fears of marginalisation and key demands such as the use of Papuan symbols have been revoked. While some of the Papuan critique of Otsus is overblown (or, more precisely, often presented with rhetorical hyperbole), special autonomy has clearly not worked as well as for example in Aceh, with actors at all levels of state administration not living up to high expectations.

Criticism of the status quo has been dangerous in the past, especially in the Suharto years, when it could lead to being labelled as being separatist or subversive, a label which could mean imprisonment or death. Although the situation has improved greatly, the political atmosphere in Papua and West Papua nonetheless remains more stifling than in the rest of Indonesia. Public displays of the Morning Star flag or calls for ‘merdeka’ (freedom) often, though not always, can lead to lengthy prison sentences for subversion.[7] Intimidation of activists and journalists working on less controversial issues such as environmental degradation, land grabbing or corruption is not uncommon. Access for foreign researchers, NGOs or media is heavily curtailed.

The growing discontent over the political settlement has been flanked, especially since 2009, by a marked upturn in violence. This violence has had numerous causes, ranging from groups affiliated to the OPM battling the security forces, local tribal conflicts, localised political and economic power struggles to millenarian religious movements (see for example ICG, 2010 for a partial overview). Many of the most high profile cases such as a series of lethal shootings along the road to the Freeport mine have remained unsolved. Increasingly, many civil society representatives in Papua and West Papua also raise the fear of violent communal conflicts both between indigenous Papuans and migrants and amongst Papuans themselves. What is often striking is how differently representatives of the Indonesian state and most Papuans I have talked to see the violence. While the official Indonesian view tends to blame either the OPM or other presumed separatists, many Papuans are inclined to see more sinister forces at work, suspecting Indonesian security forces of staging incidents to justify their lucrative presence and a repression of Papuan political aspirations.

New palm oil plantations in Kebar, West Papua. Photo by the author.

Searching for solutions

While the discontent with the status quo has been steadily growing and the number of violent incidents have been on the rise, a twin initiative by a prominent Papuan theologian, Neles Tebay, and the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, LIPI, has sought to find a way out of the impasse (see Tebay, 2009 and Widjojo, 2009).[8] The approach advocates a dialogue between ‘Jakarta’ and ‘Papua,’ i.e. the central government and Papuan representatives, based on a Road Map which advocates for addressing issues of socio-economic marginalisation, re-visiting the divergent views on the integration of Tanah Papua with Indonesia and accountability for past human rights violations. In spite of opposition from nationalists from both sides, the initiative has been slowly gaining traction. A Papua Peace Network has been conducting a series of public discussions in both provinces on the initiative and a peace conference in July 2011 brought together representatives of the central government and Papuan society.

What the declaration of independence and the resurgence of violence will mean for the delicate process of finding a negotiated solution to the multiple problems facing Tanah Papua remains to be seen. As with so many other issues, the administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has been slow to react to the challenges in the two easternmost provinces. If nothing else, the violent events of the past few weeks have at least added urgency to the process.

Bibliography

Drooglever, Pieter, 2005. Een Daad van Vrije Keuze: De Papoea’s van westelijk Nieuw-Guinea en de grenzen van het zelfbeschikkingsrecht, Amsterdam

Hernawan, Budi and van den Broek, Theo, 2001. Memoria Passionis Di Papua – Kondisi Sosial Politik dan Hak Asasi Manusia. Jayapura: SKP

ICG, 2010. Radicalisation and Dialogue in Papua, Asia Report Nº188. Brussels/Jakarta: International Crisis Group

Leith, Denise, 2003. The Politics of Power – Freeport n Suharto’s Indonesia. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press

Saltford, John, 2002. The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua, 1962-1969: Anatomy of a Betrayal. London: Routledge

Tebay, Neles, 2009. Dialog Jakarta-Papua. Sebuah Perspektif Papua, Jayapura: SKP

Widjojo, Muridan, 2009. Papua Road Map. Jakarta: LIPI

[1] The author is a post-doctoral stipend at NIAS and will be presenting a paper titled “By The Rivers Of Babylon …” – Israel, Merdeka and the Magic of the Promised Land in Papuan Political Thought at the Annual Meeting of the American Association of Anthropologists in Montreal in November 2011.

[2] There is a certain amount of potential confusion surrounding the names used to refer to the western part of the island of New Guinea. The area is divided into the two Indonesian provinces of Papua and West Papua, which were previously the province of Irian Jaya, later renamed Papua. Somewhat confusingly, both in Papuan society and outside, both provinces are often lumped together either as ‘Papua’ or ‘West Papua’ (Papua Barat). In an effort to avoid confusion, I will use the terms West Papua and Papua to refer to the respective provinces and the adjective ‘Papuan’ as pertaining to social, political, economic, cultural, etc. dynamics within the indigenous community in both provinces. I will use the term Tanah Papua (Land of Papua) to refer to the area covered by the two provinces jointly. The discussion of what constitutes the indigenous Papuan community is a rather tricky one, though, but unfortunately one which will need to be discussed elsewhere

[3] The Grasberg mine is operated by the Indonesian subsidiary of the US-based mining company Freeport McMoRan and was opened after the neighbouring Ertsberg mine was depleted in the late 1980s. For a critical history of the mine during the Suharto years, see Leith (2003)

[4] While many refer to the 19 October, 1961, as being the date of the First Congress, others place this a few months later (December 1961) or in the case of Saltford (2003) even a year to 19 October, 1962.

[5] For detailed accounts of the Act of Free Choice, see Drooglever, 2005 and Saltford, 2003

[6] It is not unusual for Papuan activists to refer to a ‘genocide,’ a claim which solidarity activists abroad have also sought to prove. For an interesting comment on the pro’s and cons of the debate, see Richard Chauvel’s commentary in Inside Indonesia 97/2009 at http://www.insideindonesia.org/index2.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1236&pop=1&page=0

[7] It should be noted, though, that while merdeka is often translated as meaning ‘freedom’ or ‘independence,’ local understandings are often far broader, ranging from freedom from want and fear to spiritual liberation in a religious sense, or even, amongst more eschatological Christians, linked to the Second Coming of Christ

[8] An abridged English language version of the Papua Road Map is available online at http://sydney.edu.au/arts/peace_conflict/docs/PAPUA_ROAD_MAP_Short_Eng.pdf

Posted in government, Indonesia, Papua, politics, Tanah Papua, West Papua | Leave a comment

Faith and Hope by Uzma Rehman

Posted on October 16, 2011 by

Outer courtyard of a shrine in Bhit Shah, Sindh province of Pakistan where an 18th Century poet-saint Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai is buried. The shrine is visited by thousands of people on daily basis.

“I am distressed, anxious and befallen. I cannot rest till I find my son again. Please do something. Please pray. Please help.” These were words uttered by Hameeda, a middle-aged tall brown-skinned lady clad in shalwar-qamis (Pakistani national dress) who arrived at Baba Ji’s (a revered man; a spiritual guide) Astana Paak in a city in southern Punjab, Pakistan.  Astana Pak is a private lodge which receives guests and devotees from various walks of life who visit in devotion for a sanctified person. She was talking to Amma-Apa, the lady of the house, opening her heart out to her. Amidst crying and sobbing, she narrated the story of the day. That morning, her 12 year old son, who mentally lags behind children of his age, asked his mother for permission to go to the shop around the corner of the street, not too far from his home as he wanted to buy himself cheeji (a local expression used by children for sweets and other things that children like to munch on or chew). His mother gave him permission as usually he visits the shop, buys his sweets and then returns home not too long thereafter. Only that morning, he did not return home after a couple of hours. The shop keeper told her that her son had left a few hours ago after buying his sweets, indicating that he had been sitting on the donkey cart used by a man selling fruit. The shop keeper thought that the fruit seller would drop the child at home after giving him a short ride. Hearing this Hameeda was overwhelmed with anxiety imagining that perhaps the fruit seller had kidnapped her son. In desperation, she asked everyone in the street if they had seen her son. Some children playing in the street pointed to a direction where the fruit seller had taken his carriage. However, Hameeda did not find her son.

 So she ran to Astana Paak to ask for the help of Baba Ji.  Amma-Apa, the lady of the house, consoled her and told her not to lose heart. Yet Hameeda was so upset that she would neither drink nor eat anything. Amma-Apa then told Baba Ji about Hameeda’s story. Baba Ji said that Hameeda should remain calm, return home, and inform him later in the evening about what had happened during the rest of the day.  In the meantime he would pray for her. Thus, Hameeda, who came in crying her heart out for her son left consoled, her tears dried by some sympathetic lady residents and visitors at Astana Paak.

As always men and women gathered in the evening at Astana Pak to listen to Baba Ji’s teachings and the qawwali music[1] that he played on his stereo sound system. Among them were Hameeda and her 12-year old son. She was happy, content, and thankful now that her son had returned. Actually, the fruit seller with a donkey cart had taken Hameeda’s son for a ride and dropped him a few streets away from their home. Here some other boys from the neighborhood helped him find his way home.

This is one of the stories that one hears when one visits Astana Paak. Ordinary Pakistanis frequently face such challenges but they find courage, consolation and support from people around them to face these challenges. Families and friends do help by offering emotional or sometimes economic support. However, individuals such as Hameeda respect and revere a person whom they have accepted as their guru as the latter provides them with hope and positive expectations.

A local music band singing folkloric songs and saints’ poetry in a Pakistani shrine on the annual celebration.

The South Asian tradition of venerating saints (sant – Sanskrit/Hindi term used primarily among Hindus; Auliya Allah- Arabic term used among Muslims) and spiritual guides (gurus - local Hindi term used among Hindus and Sikhs; and murshid – Persian/Arabic/Urdu term) is found in all major religions—Hinduism, Islam, and Sikhism. People of diverse faiths contact persons that are considered sacred due to their spiritual merits, venerate them and ask for their guidance in their worldly as well as spiritual lives. These revered persons are known to have acquired, through inner struggles, spiritual exercises and sometimes long distance travels higher stages of spiritual advancement and enlightenment under the guidance and supervision of their spiritual guides, following which some of them are commanded to guide and help the suffering humanity. Since these saintly persons are considered to be closer to God, people turn to them for blessings and prayers for various objectives such as material prosperity, marriage, fertility, cure of illnesses, welfare of families, cattle, etc. A limited number of people also contact these enlightened persons for spiritual education and training. Whereas one finds persons with genuine saintly qualities in South Asia, one also runs across fake and self-proclaimed saints who earn their living by extracting money from gullible devotees in turn for ‘unqualified’ prayers and blessings[2].

Parallel to this tradition of revered saintly persons is the practice of venerating the deceased saints in South Asia. South Asian landscape is dotted with thousands of tombs of saints and shrines. Thousands of people of diverse religious backgrounds visit these shrines on daily basis. Some major shrines where Muslim saints have been buried are visited by Hindu, Sikh, Christian and Muslim devotees alike.

Uzma Rehman has a Ph.D. from the Department of History of Religions, Institute for Regional and Crosscultural Studies, University of Copenhagen.

[1] Qawwali music is sung by groups of singers with a lead artist singing in Punjabi, Urdu and Persian about themes such as praise for Prophet Muhammad, saints and one’s spiritual guide.

[2]For an interesting reference on India’s tradition of gurus, faqirs and spiritual masters, see A Secret Search in India (1935) by Paul Brunton.

Posted in Pakistan, religion | Leave a comment

A Dane in distress

Posted on October 3, 2011 by

By Stig Toft Madsen
Research Associate, NIAS-Nordic Institute of Asian Studies

The Purulia Arms drop in 1995 was a rare example of a private team of white criminals delivering weapons to an oppositional group in India. The main organizer of the arms drop was a Dane inter alia named Niels Holck. This blog discusses various issues of the extradition case heard in the Lower Court and the Eastern High Court in 2010-11. The courts agreed that Holck could not be extradited mainly due to India’s poor human rights record. In return, India “froze” relations to Denmark

 

Niels Holck being interviewed after winning in the court in Hillerød, November 1, 2010 (Photo: Stig Toft Madsen)

 

Niels Holck is a Dane presently living in one of the better cities north of Copenhagen. In 1981, when accused of bank robbery, he escaped from the police earning him the nickname “Barfodsrøveren”, the Barefoot Robber (Hansen 2008). Later Holck went abroad where his activities apparently ranged from development work among the poor in Guatemala to gold smuggling in Africa. In that process he acquired several passports one of which identified by as Kim Peter Davy, the name by which he is known in India. Holck’s entry to India was via the Ananda Marga, a religious group which has been at loggerheads with the Indian state. In December 1995, Niels Holck dropped four tonnes of weapons over Purulia in West Bengal for the Ananda Margis from a small airplane. According to a recent interview with Peter Bleach, who was on board the plane, the consignment included “77 cases of Kalashnikov rifles, Makarov pistols, sniper rifles, anti-tank grenades, RPG rocket-launchers, anti-personnel mines, night-vision binoculars and 25,000 rounds of rifle ammunition” (Scarborough Evening News 2011). However, the arms drop was not well executed by the crew which also counted five Latvians who later became Russian citizens. After a confusing return trip from Thailand, all were arrested in Bombay airport save Niels Holck who once more managed to slip off and make his way back to Denmark.[i] When India initially requested the extradition of Holck, Denmark was unable to extradite him because the crime he stood accused of was not a crime in Denmark (sic). After the attack on USA on September 11, 2001, Denmark passed a new and tough law in 2002 enabling the extradition of Danish citizens accused of serious crimes not just to the Scandinavian countries but to the EU and to other countries as well (Lov 378). India renewed its request to get Holck in December 2002. Denmark finally agreed to India’s request on April 9, 2010, but the extradition order was challenged by Niels Holck in court. With the help of a well-articulated lawyer, Tyge Trier, and his team, Holck won the case in the lower court. The state prosecutor appealed the case to the Eastern High Court, which confirmed the decision of the lower court when an unusually large bench of five judges unanimously held his extradition illegal because India has a bad human rights record as regards treatment of prisoners. Tellingly, India has not ratified the UN Convention against Torture and not signed the Optional Protocol to the convention. The diplomatic agreement reached by India and Denmark had sought to bracket such general issues by focusing on the individual case at hand, but it was found by the court to be devoid of sufficient muscle to secure Holck’s safety if handed over to the Indian custody.[ii]

Conspiracy

According to Holck, important Indians, including a Bihari MP and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) were all parties to the arms drop and actually helped him to get back to Denmark when they realized that things had not gone as planned. According to Holck, key Indians had teamed up with him because, like him, they were frustrated with the violent communist regime in West Bengal. When the arms drop misfired they wanted to cover their trails. Were Holck to turn up in India again, the same actors or institutions would kill him to hide the truth, Holck alleges. Not only has Holck maintained that the arms drop took place with the knowledge and concurrence of the CBI and unnamed Indian MPs, but also with the knowledge and concurrence of Danish and the British Intelligence. In his version of the story, Bleach maintains that the British intelligence services were aware of what he did as an arms dealer after he contacted the Defense Export Services Organization to seek clarifications regarding the proposed arms sale. The MI5/MI6 sensed that a crime was in the making and they contacted the Indian authorities.[iii] British intelligence, Bleach holds, let him proceed with the plan to enable the Indian authorities to catch the kingpin, i.e. Holck, red-handed. Bleach acceded to the advice of the British authorities, thereby deceiving Holck. This was the storyline presented by Bleach when he made an appearance in the Danish High Court in 2011 and it may contain more grains of truth than Holck’s version. In a debate on this issue, the British Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs said in a response to an MP:

“The hon. Gentleman also asked whether Mr. Bleach advised officials of issues relating to the arms drop. I can confirm that he provided details to North Yorkshire police about the arms drop during interviews on three separate occasions—on 14 September, 22 September and 8 December 1995. On 22 September and 8 December the police strongly advised Mr. Bleach to withdraw from the deal and not to go to India. The information given by Mr. Bleach was passed on to the Indian authorities on three separate occasions—10 November, 17 November and 15 December 1995.” (www.parliament.uk, 2002)

The British, it appears from this, were aware of the plan, but they did not concur. To me it is inconceivable that British Intelligence would accede to clandestinely arm a small and geopolitically insignificant sect against the democratically elected government in West Bengal in India.[iv]

The main armed opponent of the government led by the Communist Party of India (Marxist) was never Ananda Marga. Its main opponent was the Maoist revolutionaries, or Naxalites, who intensified the class war in the late 1960s. During this period when the Congres was still in power, and later after the Left Front CPI(M)-led government came to power in 1977, the police spared few means to subjugate the revolutionaries. One of the people tortured was Archana Guha whom the police picked up in 1974 while in search of her brother. She was tortured under the supervision of Runu Guha Neogi against whom Archana Guha filed a case in 1977 after she was released. With the help of Amnesty International and others, she came to Denmark where she received treatment. The trial took nineteen years. In 1996, Runu Guha Neogi was sentence to one year’s simple imprisonment with a possibility to appeal (Roy 1996). During this period, the Left Front government did not suspend Neogi who retired as Deputy Commissioner of Police (Roy 1996).

Apart for its role in suppressing the Maoist revolutionaries, there is another side to the CPI(M). As one of its critics, Ramachandra Guha, has conceded:

It may be that of all the major parties in India, it is only the leaders of the CPI(M) who do not have Swiss bank accounts. (Some do not even have Indian bank accounts.) Their views may be out-of-date, even bizarre, but in their conduct and demeanour most major leaders of the CPI(M) are—the word is inescapable—gentlemen. As a bourgeois friend of mine puts it, they are the kind of people in whose homes she can safely permit her teenaged daughter to spend the night (Guha 2011).

Had British intelligence attempted to remove the CPI(M)-led government from office it could have created uproar far greater than the benefits such a removal might have entailed.

Arms supplies and resistance

It is not easy, in fact, to find any example of European governments aiding and abetting armed uprisings in independent India. Perhaps, the person to close in on is George Fernandes, the labor leader and socialist MP who rose to become the Defense Minister of India. Fernandes was accused (but never convicted) in the “Baroda Dynamite Case” of plotting to set off small bombs during the Emergency. Before and after he was apprehended in Calcutta in June 1976, he and his family did receive moral support and physical shelter from several Western governments or their representatives, but even during Emergency I doubt that UK or other Western European countries provided weapons for Fernandes or for anyone else in miniscule armed resistance to the Emergency regime.

Could Holck have a point about Indians in key positions condoning illegal trade in arms for non-state actors? Here it may again be worth noting that Fernandes has been sympathetic to several armed groups, including the LTTE. As Defense Minister… “In July 1998, he reportedly stopped the Indian Navy from intercepting ships suspected of carrying illegal arms to Tamil guerrilla groups…” The Sri Lankan government reportedly stated that, “the LTTE’s biggest supporter in India is Defence Minister George Fernandes” (Wikipedia). Fernandes has also morally supported Burmese rebel groups and students fighting the military government both before he became Defense Minister and while in office. Arms dealers supplying weapons (similar to those dropped over Purulia) to Naga and Assamese rebel groups in North-East India and in Burma are alleged to have been given free passage in the Andaman Sea on the order of the Defense Secretary while Fernandes was the minister. These allegations were fielded by amongst other the former Navy Chief Vishnu Bhagwat. I am mentioning this not only to lend some credence to Holck’s version of events, but also because after the extradition case against Holck in the Danish High Court was decided in 2011, the Government of India (GOI) asserted that the Danish decision not to appeal to the Supreme Court would increase the risk of international crime and terror. A former Defense Minister of India could be accused of having done much the same. In all cases, the counter-argument would be that external support to just armed resistance is legitimate – even if directed against democratic states.[v]

The “Purulia Arms Drop” made front-page news in India, but it is not as if the Ananda Marga is the only group in India or South Asia which has imported weapons for its struggles. The Maoist groups in the “Red Corridor” in central India have apparently been supplied weapons through a supply chain stretching from Tamil Nadu to Nepal, The Khalistani Sikhs imported relatively advanced weapons for their secessionist struggle launched around 1980, and umpteen Islamic jihadist groups have received weapons from Pakistan off and on from October 1947 onwards.[vi]

At home India has a considerable sector of illegal small-arms manufacturing. A United Nations study has reported that Indian civilians have around 40 million firearms of which only around 15 percent are licensed (Asian Age 2011). By tapping into these arms distribution networks Holck would probably have gotten a bigger bang for his buck than by contacting a Rhodesian Brit and five Latvians with scant local knowledge. But, then, he evidently wanted to supply the Ananda Marga with advanced weapons of a higher caliber than were necessary for an ordinary watch guard.

The Purulia Arms Drop remains unique insofar as it involved an airdrop of arms by White Westerners to a religious group. The reaction in policy circles in India to the case may be compared to the Pakistani reaction to the US raid on Osama bin Laden’s residence in Abbottabad. In both cases the elite felt hurt when Western incursions into national airspace starkly exposed their state’s inability to enforce its sovereignty. In the Pakistani case, the reaction was widespread. In the Indian case, the reaction has been largely limited to the elite. The “Bengali Street” has been largely silent perhaps because the enmity between the Ananda Margis and others in West Bengal has declined considerable over the years. Moreover, the Ananda Margis themselves have kept a low profile as regards Niels Holck.

Self-defense and legal activism: Holck and Salwa Judum

What was the motive for the arms drop? As far as I can see, Holck purchased and dropped the weapons because he sympathized with the Ananda Margis whom he felt were persecuted by the West Bengal government and perhaps also by Maoist armed groups operating in the Purulia area. Others may have known about the plans, but Holck remained the driving force. It was his project. Who among the Ananda Margis wanted the weapons is unclear, but Holck wanted the Ananda Margis to have the weapons for “self-defense.” At the very end of the High Court case, Holck said that he wanted the truth to come out and that he would win a fair court trial case because the right to self-defense is a valid legal argument. The issue, therefore, arises when a situation exists that allows an actor to disregard the state’s monopoly of the legitimate use of force.

The Indian Penal Code (IPC) recognizes the right to self-defense in section 81, which states that … “Nothing is an offence merely by reason of its being done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause harm, if it be done without any criminal intention to cause harm, and in good faith for the purpose of preventing or avoiding other harm to person or property.” I am not sure whether an Indian court would find this section of the IPC applicable if Holck were to stand trial in India, but it is worth noting that the Indian state recently has walked the same thin line as Holck. In the struggle against the armed uprising of the Naxalites/Maoists in the state of Chhattisgarh in Central India, the GOI in 2005 raised an armed force of about 6,500 barely literate village youth aged seventeenth upwards ordering them to operate as Special Police Officers within the law at a honorarium of Rs. 3000 per month, i.e. much less than the 10 dollars a day that Taliban foot soldiers are said to receive. This force, named Salwa Judum, proceeded to engage in “mass violations of fundamental constitutional rights” (Venkatesan 2011:44) often in connection with the forced removal of people from “naxalite-infested villages” to safe village under Salwa Judum control. In 2007 anthropologist Nandini Sundar, who is professor of sociology at Delhi University, together with the historian-anthropologist Ramachandra Guha, and EAS Sarma, former Secretary to GOI and former Commissioner for Tribal Welfare, Government of Andhra Pradesh filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court. The court accepted the petition as a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) case. Eleven judges heard the case for 26 days over several years before delivering the verdict in 2011. The case was repeatedly stalled by the Government of Chhattisgarh, confirming that it is not only private litigants who are adept at prolonging litigation in India, but that official India is equally adept in the art of adjournments.

The verdict of the Supreme Court in Nandini Sundar and others vs State of Chhattishgarh went in favor of the petitioners finding the formation of Salwa Judum an abrogation of the state’s obligation to protect its citizens by a professionally trained police force only. The court “directed the State government to prevent the operation of Salwa Judum or any other such group that seeks to take the law into its own hands or violates human rights of any person” (Venkatesan 2011:44). In other words, the court affirmed the state’s monopoly of violence specifying that the state can only delegate its right to use force to duly constituted groups. By extension, if the state did not have a right to defend its citizens against the Maoist threat – which is a real threat – by raising a motley army in the name of self-defense, it is also not likely that an equally motley crew of non-nationals would enjoy the right to arm a socio-religious group like the Ananda Marga. Niels Holck, the Government of Chhattisgarh, and the GOI seem alike in their in misconstruing the right to self-defense.[vii]

Were Danes and others to be acquainted only with acts of armed rebellion and armed “self-defense” in India, the decision in the Salwa Judum case would seem surprising. It is worth, therefore, to look closer at how the Supreme Court of India arrived at its decision. The short answer is: By legal activism and the scholarly deployment of social science. For a start, in section 2, the court says:

2. As we heard the instant matters before us, we could not but help be reminded of the novella, “Heart of Darkness” by Joseph Conrad, who perceived darkness at three levels: (1) the darkness of the forest, representing a struggle for life and the sublime; (ii) the darkness of colonial expansion for resources; and finally (iii) the darkness, represented by inhumanity and evil, to which individual human beings are capable of descending, when supreme and unaccounted force is vested, rationalized by a warped world view that parades itself as pragmatic and inevitable, in each individual level of command.

The verdict goes on to deride the “development paradigm unleashed by the State”, arguing that:

“The root cause of the problem, and hence its solution, lies elsewhere. The culture of unrestrained selfishness and greed spawned by modern neo-liberal economic ideology, and the false promises of ever increasing spirals of consumption leading to economic growth that will lift everyone, under-gird this socially, politically and economically unsustainable set of circumstances in vast tracts of India in general, and Chhattisgarh in particular.“

Touching on the “resource curse” and “developmental terrorism’, the Supreme Court verdict posits that:

“Policies of rapid exploitation of resources by the private sector, without credible commitments to equitable distribution of benefits and costs, and environmental sustainability, are necessarily violative of principles that are “fundamental to governance”, and when such a violation occurs on a large scale, they necessarily also eviscerate the promise of equality before law, and equal protection of the laws, promised by Article 14, and the dignity of life assured by Article 21.”

The verdict muses that:

“Tax breaks for the rich, and guns for the youngsters amongst poor, so that they keep fighting amongst themselves, seems to be the new mantra from the mandarins of security and high economic policy of the State. This, apparently, is to be the grand vision for the development of a nation that has constituted itself as a sovereign, secular, socialist and democratic republic”

Before finally ordering that:

“(i) The State of Chattisgarh immediately cease and desist from using SPOs in any manner or form in any activities, directly or indirectly, aimed at controlling, countering, mitigating or otherwise eliminating Maoist/Naxalite activities in the State of Chattisgarh;”

… and that:

(v) The State of Chattisgarh shall take all appropriate measures to prevent the operation of any group, including but not limited to Salwa Judum and Koya Commandos, that in any manner or form seek to take law into private hands, act unconstitutionally or otherwise violate the human rights of any person…..”

The Supreme Court’s verdict has been received very positively by some commentators. Liang (2011) writes that

“This judgment attains such greatness by virtue of its deft combination of insightful legal analysis, the articulation of a moral vision of constitutionalism and development and its sharp invocation of rhetoric (in the best sense of the term) and fiction to buttress its arguments” (Liang 2011).

In his write-up about the case, Venkatesan (2011: 46) makes reference to the 22 initial paragraphs of the judgment, which, as is evident from the above, are critiques of the “the neoliberal development paradigm and the resultant privatisation and globalisation” rather than typical legal arguments. The reason behind all of this is that the Indian Supreme Court since the 1970s has often been an activist court, which basically means a court “at war” with the way the legal system and the state normally works. Legal activism has been an emergency answer, or safety-valve, to the inordinate delays and the miscarriage of justice that are endemic to the courts. By taking up cases at the behest of concerned individuals without locus standi, the Supreme Court (and to some extent the state High Courts) have been able to re-interpret the fundamental civil and political rights and the directive principles in the Constitution. This means that Indian law is internally compromised and that it may externally compromise the state as it did in the Salwa Judum case. Since the invention of PIL in the 1970´s, Indians have been able at once to decry the Indian Penal Code and other laws as “colonial” while lionizing and exploiting Article 21 (guaranteeing the broadly interpreted “Right to Life”) and Article 14 (guaranteeing ”equality”) of the Constitution to secure a series of landmark judgement.[viii] Often this has been affected by applying justiciable political rights to social and economic issues where the non-justiciable Directive Principles exercise less clout. As Shankar notes (2009: xiv-xix), these legal innovations (bordering on judicial populism) took place in the aftermath of the Emergency which had undermined the Constitution. The courts tried to make up for its mistakes.

The number of PIL-cases has declined since the 1970. In 2008, PIL-cases only constituted around 2% of the cases seeking a Supreme Court hearing and very few of them were eventually admitted. Moreover, many PIL-cases are now entertained by the rich and powerful. Nevertheless, as the Salwa Judum case shows, the Supreme Court may still act as a forceful corrective to the executive akin to the courageous verdicts passed by the President of the Israel Supreme Court Aharon Barak.[ix] On this background it is understandable that the GOI, and Indians at large, may expect the Danish courts to take on a similar trailblazing role, but the Danish courts do not take that bait because they aim to maintain coherence in the face of contestation. A Danish court may be flexible, but the activism that has taken roots in India using PIL as an unorthodox quasi-political tool to intervene as a “last resort for the oppressed and bewildered” (Robinson 2010) has no counterpart in Denmark. In Denmark there is a strong Ombudsmand’s institution, but, so far, there is no PIL and no Anna Hazare short-circuiting the law and the legal process. The Ombudsmand’s institution takes up around 50 cases in its annual reports which the executive often consider as guidelines. It is rare, however, that ministers are impeached or civil servants tried (Elbæk-Jørgensen 2001: 223). The Danish political system may on occasion bend over backwards as it did in order to promise Holck’s extradition, but Danish courts remain careful. They see themselves neither as protagonists of the civil society, nor as tools of the state.

In the Niels Holck case, the prosecutors limited the scope of their arguments to the central issues: Could Niels Holck be extradited or not? Noting that Danish law now opens for extradition to any country in the world and showing that both governments had proceeded correctly in entering into a diplomatic agreement, the prosecution largely left it at that. When the prosecution lost twice because the courts held that it could not be ruled out that Holck would be submitted to torture or mistreatment in Indian jails, the state chose not to appeal. In India, appeals all the way to the Supreme Court are common. In 2008, there was a 2.5 per cent likelihood that a case would be appealed from High Court to Supreme Court. In cases originating in Delhi the likelihood rose to 10 per cent (Robinson 2010). The official India might have felt disappointed by the non-activist manner in which the Danish prosecution argued the case, but it certainly felt disappointed about the decision not to appeal. Indians in Denmark expressed such opinions (Copenhagen Post Online 2011). Some held that the Danish decision not to extradite Hock was a result of a colonial superiority complex. Basing her interpretation on readers’ comments on the Blogosphere rather than on the court case at hand, which she considers less interesting, Kaur argued that while the official Danish policy of opening up for extradition correctly reflected the new reality of India’s increased economic and political power, the Danish public stayed mired in old prejudices viewing India as a pre-modern and uncivilized country to which Danish citizens should not be extradited (Kaur 2011). In contrast, a number of Danes to whom I have spoken consider it right that Hock is made to face justice in India not in order to atone for colonial misdeeds, nor in order to kowtow to the rising superpower, but because of the crime he had apparently committed. The irony is that it is the law (and not money or political influence) which stands in the way of extradition.

After a period of silence, the GOI in August 2011 announced it would freeze relations to Denmark as a (collective) punishment for its failure to extradite Holck. The Danish government did not announce any counter-measure but expressed its regret while it contemplated seeking the assistance of the EU (Bostrup 2011). The situation was reminiscent of the Muhammad cartoon crisis where Third World powers also felt slighted and put pressure on the Danish government to “do more”. In both cases the Danish government responded that court decisions – whether about cartoons or extradition – should be respected. The basic difference seems to be that among “argumentative Indians” contestation is God: Legal decisions are not necessarily reached by reference to the law in a narrow technical sense but by allowing a plurality of elite and subaltern interests to be presented and a compromise worked out within an expanded constitutional framework. Legal pluralism allows for such contestation while legal monism seeks closure by applying Occam’s razor.[x]

In India over 50,000 people were detained under TADA (Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act) over a period of ten years. Less than one percent of them were convicted (Shankar 2009: xxi). Doing more may not always be very efficient from a legal point of view.

 

RE-FRAMING THE ISSUE, SHARPENING ARGUMENTS AND COUNTER-ARGUMENTS

How could the prosecution conceivably have turned the case to his or her advantage? For a start the prosecutor could have painted a more detailed picture of the Ananda Marga which would have challenged the image Holck and the defense counsel painted of a development organization building schools and hospitals. What is the Ananda Marga?  Based on an article by Helen Crovetto (Crovetto 2008), I have offered a short answer to this question in an earlier NIAS blog (Madsen 2010).

Please see http://infocus.asiaportal.info/2010/04/29/the-path-of-bliss/

Had the prosecution paused to paint a detailed picture of the Ananda Marga it might have re-framed the issue from one relating to the legality of extradition versus the protection of individual human rights to an issue of the duty of one democratic state not to assist, actively or passively, any of its citizens to foster violence in another democratic state versus the protection of individual human rights. This would have addressed the question that many Danes have raised: “What if Indians dropped weapons over Copenhagen? Would Denmark not demand that such arms-droppers be extradited?” (Information 2007; see also Kyrø 2011, Hansen 2008), and it might have enabled the court to reach another verdict.

To illuminate the context, the prosecution could have reiterated that India has repeatedly sought the extradition of various people without success. India wanted LTTE-supremo Prabhakaran for the murder of Rajiv Gandhi, but did not get him. India wants Warren Anderson, the ex-CEO of Union Carbide headquartered in the USA, to face trial in the Bhopal Gas Leaks Case (Expressindia 2010, Misra 2011, and Zeenews 2011). Well-known writer and journalist MJ Akbar feels that Anderson showed contempt for the Indian legal system when he left India (or absconded) in 1984 (Akbar 2010). India also demands the extradition of about a dozen people hiding in Pakistan ranging from Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar for his alleged involvement in the Bombay Blasts in March 1992 to the Lashkar-e-Toiba and ISI operatives behind the attack on Mumbai in November 2008.[xi] The fact that India wants for the extradition of several others apart from Holck increases the likelihood that India would treat Hock according the agreement reached with Denmark in order to facilitate the extradition of other, and more wanted, persons, the prosecution could have argued. From the Indian point of view, the failure to hand over Niels Holck is one more example of other countries obstructing the process of bringing criminals to justice. The decision hurt Indian pride at a time when India has made a number of sweet deals in (including the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement) in the diplomatic field. With Indian pride growing, the setback in the legal sphere caused official rancor.

In return, the defense counsel could have mustered a list of Indians living in India and hiding from prosecution elsewhere. For example, he could have cited the case of confidence trickster and serial killer Charles Sobhraj who took shelter for decades in Indian jails (sic!) to avoid prosecution in Thailand (Wikipedia).  Or he could have pointed to the case of Haji Mohammed Yaqoob, Minister for Haj and Minority Welfare in the state of Uttar Pradesh who in 2006 promised Rs 51 crore and the equivalent in gold of the weight of anyone who would chop off the head of Danish cartoonist Kurt Westergaard (Dougal 2006). Indian authorities apparently have not taken the initiative to prosecute this honorable MLA.

Apart from the above possibilities to reframe the issue the prosecutor could have pursued obvious mistakes on the defense side. For example, Niels Holck claimed that he did not know the true size of the consignment until the crates containing the weapons were reloaded in Varanasi airport. But then he felt helpless to do anything about it because, as he explained in High Court, the temperature was 55 degrees centigrade. Here the prosecution could have informed the court that in Varanasi the average maximum temperature for the month of December when the airdrop took place is less than 25 degree Celsius and the average minimum temperature about 10 degrees Celsius. The temperature, in other words, is likely to have been quite pleasant. Similarly, the prosecution could have faulted the defense lawyer for arguing that it would take 19 hours to drive the approximately 1,400 km from Delhi to Calcutta according to Google map by informing the court that the Danish embassy staff would most likely take a plane to Calcutta. More seriously, the prosecution could have nullified a string of key arguments the defense counsel made in the Lower Court and to a lesser extent in the High Court to the effect that prison conditions and police and army brutality was a particular problem in West Bengal. Several of the sources (International Red Cross, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch) which the defense counsel cited to build this argument referred to North-East India and not to West Bengal. In effect, the court was led up the garden path when the defense counsel wrongly placed West Bengal in North-East India. Further, the prosecution could have argued that it is never possible to guarantee that Holck, or anyone else, would not suffer death in an Indian prison. The prison population of India was about 332,112 (BBC News no date). The total number of prisoners who died in 2006 was reported to be 1,424 (Udskrift af Østre Landsrets Dombog, p. 10) amounting to 0.43%. In Denmark in 2009 the total prison population was 9,732 of who six died and six committed suicide (Kriminalforsorgen 2009, table 9.2). This amounts to 0.12%. There is a clear difference between India and Denmark but it is not as vast as the defense counsel (and Peter Bleach) indicated.

In return the defense counsel could have argued that the case against Hock could drag on for much longer than visualized in the diplomatic agreement between the two countries. The public prosecutor in the lower court held up the promise that Holck could be back in Denmark in three weeks provided he pleaded guilty, but the diplomatic agreement specified that Holck would not be tried in a Special Court. This means that the case would be initiated in a court of first instance, in casu the Calcutta Chief Metropolitan Court, from where appeals and interventions may be made (by either party or by third parties) to High Court, the Supreme Court and finally as a mercy petition to the President. Mercy petitions with the Indian President regularly take many years to decide.[xii] In effect, the case could plausibly drag on for years.

Even so the prosecution could insist that the issue is properly one of how democracies should relate to each other in the long run in a globalizing world. Political science claims that democracies do not wage war against each other. How could a Dane be allowed to do so with impunity? Denmark, as the prosecution did say in the Lower Court, should not become a safe haven (“et helle”) for terrorists. As the Security Council resolution 1373 states:

By other terms, the Council decided that all States should prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against other countries and their citizens. States should also ensure that anyone who has participated in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice. They should also ensure that terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that the seriousness of such acts is duly reflected in sentences served (Security Council 2001).

As noted by Sasikumar who traces the India route from “sponsor state” to “victim state”:

“This resolution has become the rallying point for ‘victim states’ like India. Indian leaders draw attention to the fact that it proscribes all forms of support to terrorists” (Sasikumar 2010: 620).

International cooperation is based both on law and on trust. India bent over backwards, exhibiting its soft underbelly in the process, to accord Denmark exceptionally broad guarantees in order to capitalize on the new situation arising after September 11, 2001. However, Holck still evaded them because the Danish courts did not want to extradite a citizen to an uncertain fate outside its civilisational orbit. As the defense counsel noted at the end of the High Court case: “This is a difficult case. It is the first time that a Dane risks being extradited outside the West European cultural area” (“Dette er en vanskelig sag. Det er første gang en dansker i givet fald skal sendes uden for vor vesteuropæiske kulturkreds”). Prominent defense lawyers, such as Trier, tend to plead for the rights of refugees to stay in Denmark. Drawing on international human rights law, they seem correspondingly eager to protect clients from extradition. On the prosecution side, feeble attempts to reframe the issue with reference to international law, the common fight against terror and the importance of supporting an ordered process of globalization turned out fruitless as the bench kept its focus on the protection of individual human rights.

Holck’s argument about the right to self-defense against communist misrule – setting aside the state monopoly of violence – was left hanging in the air. Perhaps the prosecution should have shot it down as it was shot down in the Salwa Judum case. The argument that a person, or a people, have a right to self-defense may have merit, but often is does not. In July 2011 Anders Behring Breivik committed a gruesome act of terror in Norway. Like Holck, he claimed to be fighting communism. Like Holck, the ideology of this “Angry Norwegian” was framed as a form of self-defense directed, in his case, against Islamic incursion into Norway abetted by the treason of crypto-communist multiculturalists paying no heed to the right to national self-determination. Breivik is likely to receive a hard punishment. It was India’s bad record which has prevented Holck from being sentenced. In that sense India has itself to thank for its defeat.

Interestingly, the Calcutta High Court has subsequently upbraided the Indian government for not ratifying the Convention against Torture: Acting on a petition the High Court directed the GOI to ensure that India would ratify the Convention against Torture because, “If the U.N. Convention against Torture had been ratified in Parliament, it might have been possible to ensure the extradition of Kim Davy” (The Hindu 2011).

This may be a vain hope, however. As has been argued by Asian Human Rights Commission, what counts is not only the signing of conventions, but reforming the police force which are charged with doing an impossible job:

“In most cases the officers are expected to discharge a job that no one in the world could ever do. For instance, what could a police officer responsible for traffic control do if the roads are filled with persons driving vehicles who obtained their licences by merely paying bribes?; what could a traffic police officer do if the junction at which the officer is posted has no traffic lights and the road conditions are terrible due to corruption in road construction?; how can a police officer investigate a crime other than by torturing a suspect and obtaining a confession when the officer is not trained in scientific crime investigation?; what else could a police officer do other than demanding and accepting bribes when the officer is not provided a house in the city where the officer is posted and forced to rent a house that would almost cost half of the officer’s salary?; how can police stations function when the telephones and vehicles at the station do not work?; what morality will such a force have when they are expected to protect political masters who enjoy fruits of corruption?

…

Of equal importance is the role of the Indian civil society, including the country’s media, to keep a focus upon the conditions of the police and to hear their concerns. In that there is no sense for the civil society to push the government to ratify the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), which the government for understandable reasons is delaying to undertake. The ratification of CAT without having a comprehensive national policing policy to improve the state of policing makes no sense. In fact in the neighbouring countries like Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh, which have all ratified the CAT without a sensible policy to improve the state of policing in these jurisdictions are examples from which both the government, and the civil society in India can draw learning (Asian Human Rights Commission 2011).”

It seems that even if the prosecution had been more innovative, (s)he would have a hard time convincing the judge to allow Holck’s extradition.

 

REFERENCES

Akbar, MJ, 2010,”Anderson laughed at Indian law and State”, Times of India, 20 June, http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/TheSiegeWithin/entry/anderson-laughed-at-indian-law

Asian Age 2011, “40m civilian-owned firearms in India: UN”,September 21,  http://www.asianage.com/india/40m-civilian-owned-firearms-india-un-385

Asian Age, “Fernandes in Nanda pocket: Adm. Bhagwat”, 23 February, retrieved from http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/reg.burma/archives/199902/msg00498.html on September 12, 2011.

BBC News (no date), World Prison Populations, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/06/prisons/html/nn2page1.stm

Bostrup, Jens (2011) “EU star klar til at hjælpe Danmark mod Indien”, Politiken, Internationalt, 19. August, p. 8.

Copenhagen Post Online, “Indian residents claim “hypocrisy” in Holck case”, August 24, http://www.cphpost.dk/news/international/89-international/52029-indians-in-denmark-hypocrisy-in-holck-case.html.

Crovetto, Helen (2008)”Ananda Marga and the Use of Force”, Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions, 12, 1: 26-56. Also published in Violence and New Religious Movements. Edited by James R. Lewis. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Dougal, Sundeep (2006) “Off With His Head!”, Outlook, February 20, http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?230294

Expressindia, 2010, “Bhopal gas tragedy: ‘Case against Carbide chief still on’”, June 8, www.expressindia.com/latest-news/Bhopal-gas-tragedy-Case-against-Carbide-chief-still-on/631089/.

Gokhale, Nitin A, 1999, “Why is George Fernandes allowing gun-running that hit the army?”, Outlook, retrieved from http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/reg.burma/archives/199902/msg00334.html on September 12, 2011.

Guha, Ramachandra (2011) “After the Fall”, The Caravan, June 1, www.caravanmagazine.in/Story.aspx?Storyid=916&StoryStyle=FullStory

Hansen, John (2008) “En forsvarstale”. Review of Niels Holck and Øivind Kyrø, De kalder mig terrorist, People’s Press, http://bog.guide.dk/Erindringer/Niels%20Holck/Samfund/Om%20forfatterne/En_forsvarstale_1350977

Information, 2007, “‘Hvad nu hvis det var en inder, der havde kastet våben ned over Nørrebro?”, 21. August.

India Today (1996), “A Lethal Invasion”, Special Reports, February 15, pp. 42-55.

Indian Penal Code, Act No. 45 of 1860, http://districtcourtallahabad.up.nic.in/articles/IPC.pdf

Kaur, Ravinder (2011) “Danske vrangbilleder af Indien. Fatter danske medier ikke, at Indien i dag er en global og demokratisk magt og ikke et levn fra en fjern kolonitid?”, Politiken, kronik, http://i.pol.dk/debat/kroniker/article1394112.ece

Kyrø, Øjvind (2010) ”Ministerens ikke-viden”, Weekendavisen, Samfund, p. 2.

Kyrø, Øjvind (2011), ”Skæbnedage”, Weekendavisen, Samfund, April 17, p. 2, 23. september

Kriminalforsorgen 2009, Statistik, Direktoratet for Kriminalforsorgen.

Misra, Savvy Soumya, “CBI can seek Anderson’s extradition”, Down to Earth, April 30, 2011, www.downtoearth.org.in

Liang, Lawrence, 2011, “A beacon of light in the heart of darkness: SC holds Salwa Judum unconstitutional”, Kafila, July 6, http://kafila.org/2011/07/06/a-beacon-of-light-in-the-heart-of-darkness-sc-holds-salwa-juddam-unconstitutional/#more-8334

LOV nr 378, Lov om ændring af straffeloven, retsplejeloven, lov om konkurrence- og forbrugerforhold på telemarkedet, våbenloven, udleveringsloven samt lov om udlevering af lovovertrædere til Finland, Island, Norge og Sverige (Gennemførelse af FN-konventionen til bekæmpelse af finansiering af terrorisme, gennemførelse af FN s Sikkerhedsråds resolution nr. 1373 (2001) samt øvrige initiativer til bekæmpelse af terrorisme m.v.), www.retsinformation.dk/forms/r0710.aspx?id=1344

Madsen, Stig Toft (2010) “The Path of Bliss”, Focus Blog, NIAS, http://infocus.asiaportal.info/2010/04/29/the-path-of-bliss/

Madsen, Stig Toft (1996) State, Society and Human Rights in South Asia, New Delhi: Manohar.

Oskarsson, Patrik (2010) The law of the land contested: Bauxite mining in tribal, central India in an age of economic reform, PhD dissertation, School of International Development, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK, accessed at http://zweland.net/ on September 2, 2011.

PRS Research (2010) “The Prevention of Torture Bill, 2010”, http://www.prsindia.org/billtrack/the-prevention-of-torture-bill-2010-1129/

Rediff.com, 2000, “Fernandes’s flirtation with LTE is ominous for Sri Lanka”, December 7, http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/dec/07spec.htm

Robinson, Nick (2010) “The Judiciary: Hard to reach”, Frontline 27: 3, January 30, http://flonnet.com/fl2703/stories/20100212270304600.htm

Roy, Biren (1996) ”Archana Guha’s Fight for Justice”, Economic and Political Weekly XXXI, 31: 2069, , August 3.

Sasikumar, Karthika (2010) “State Agency in the time of the global war on terror: India and the counter-terrorism regime”, Review of International Studies 36: 615-38.

Scarborough Evening News, “Scarborough’s Peter Bleach tells us his story”, August 31, 2011, http://www.scarborougheveningnews.co.uk/community/local-focus/scarborough_s_peter_bleach_tells_us_his_story_1_3501499

SECURITY COUNCIL, ANTI-TERRORISM RESOLUTION; Resolution 1373, Dated 28/09/2001, see e.g. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3c4e94552a.html

Shankar, Shylashri (2009) Scaling Justice. India’s Supreme Court, Anti-Terror Law, and Social Rights, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Singh, Prabhakar (2010) “Indian International Law: From a Colonized Apologist to a Subaltern Protagonist”, Leiden Journal of International Law 23: 79-103

Supreme Court of India, Nandini Sundar and others (petitioners) vs State of Chhattishgarh (respondents), ITEM NO.44 COURT NO.9 SECTION PIL, WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO(s). 250 OF 2007,  http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/wc25007.pdf

The Hindu (2011) “Kim Davy extradition: time sought to file affidavits”, The Hindu, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2453673.ece

The Independent (2000),  “Mission Improbable”, February 1, www.independent.co.uk/news/people/profiles/mission-improbable-726033.html

Wikipedia “Charles Sobhraj”, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Sobhraj

Udskrift af Østre Landsrets Dombog, Kendelse, Afsagt den 30. Juni 2011 af Østre Landsrets 11. Afdeling, kære nr. S-3321-10, pp. 18.

Venkatesan, V (2011) “A proven case”, Frontline, August 12,  pp. 43-46.

Walzer, Michael, (1977) Just and Unjust Wars …

Wikipedia, “George Fernandes”, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Fernandes#cite_note-66

Wikipedia, Simon Mann, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simon_Mann.

www.parliament.uk, 27 Nov 2002: Column 114WH-121WH, Mr. Peter Bleach.

Zeenews, 2011, “Why was Anderson not questioned, CIC asks CBI”, June 20, http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/why-was-anderson-not-questioned-cic-asks-cbi_714072.html

FOOTNOTES

[i]  To be added: India Today article from 1995.

[ii] I attended some of the court meetings in the lower court in Hillerød and some of the meetings in the High Court in Copenhagen and I also monitored press coverage of the case to some extent.

[iii] The MI5 and the MI6 may have worked at cross-purpose in dealing with Holck. I hope to be able to add details later. See also Kyrø (2010).

[iv] Holck and Bleach both had previous experience from Africa and the Purulia Arms drop bears resemblance to African cases, in particular to the failed attempt in 2004 of British mercenary Simon Francis Mann to overthrow the President of Equatorial Guinea with the help of a group of mercenaries in order to install another President to gain access to the country’s oil wealth (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simon_Mann).

[v] On Fernandes, see Asian Age 1999, Gokhale 1999, Rediff.com 2000, and Wikipedia. The Sri Lankan Tamil groups, including the Tamil Tigers, also received weapons and training from the Indian army in the early 1980s (Madsen 1996: 176). Later the Indian air-force airdropped food as humanitarian relief for the beleaguered Tamils in Jaffna. Sri Lanka vociferously protested this blatant violation of Sri Lankan airspace but in this case India chose to help the Tamils rather than abiding to the principle of national sovereignty.

[vi] See India Today (1996) for an overview of weapon routes in India.

 [vii] Other relevant legal case from Denmark would include the Danish resistance groups to whom the British air force dropped weapons during WWII. In the legal aftermath to the war, these resistance fighters were found non-culpable. The Danish police, who were charged with stopping them, were also found non-culpable (oral communication, Mads S Jakobsen). Contemporary cases of ostensibly legal self-defense include the authorization given to the CIA to kill US-born Anwar al-Awlaqi. He was killed in a drone strike in Yemen in September 2011. For an extended  analysis of the right to intervene in other countries, see Walzer 1977, chapter 6.

[viii] A similar schism between Indian laws and British values were used by lawyers and politicians during the independence movement to dislodge the British.

[ix] Another comparison has been made between Justice Krishna Iyer and Tom Bingham, Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales (Raghavan 2010).

[x] See Singh (2010) for a glib attempt to deploy social science, in casu subaltern studies, to modern international law. For a recent study on mining politics, see Oskarsson (2010) who is puzzled by the fact that “Some fundamental rights have become established to the point where it is very difficult to change them, and land for tribal people seems to be one such right” (Oskarssson 2010: 239). The reason, again, is legal and political activism.

[xii] The appeal procedure was moot point in the court proceedings. I am referring here to a brief conversation I had with Ijaz Khan, the Indian CBI official present. The position also emerges from the High Court verdict, page 4.


Posted in Human rights, India, Law, terrorism | 1 Comment

A female serial killer’s literary roots: Murakami Haruki, 1Q84 and Aomame

Posted on September 19, 2011 by

Five years after the long novel Kafka on the shore, Japanese author Haruki Murakami’s trilogy 1Q84 was published in Japan in 2009-10 where it quickly became a bestseller. With details of the book kept strictly secret prior to its release, anticipating Murakami readers had to satisfy their curiosity with train posters such as the above.

The Danish translation of book 1 is released on September 29 and for the first time Danish readers will get their Murakami fix before the English translation hits bookstores across the world at the end of October.

PhD candidate at University of Cambridge and associated PhD candidate at NIAS, Gitte Marianne Hansen shows how Murakami’s latest novel relates to a group of largely ignored Murakami works that portray female protagonists, main characters and narrators.

 

Photographed by John Kyle Dorton, March 2009 onboard Tokyo metro line Tozai-sen.

SPOILER ALERT: this text reveals a few details from Murakami Haruki’s latest novel1Q84, book 1, chapter 1.

 

A female serial killer’s literary roots: Murakami Haruki, 1Q84 and Aomame

With sale-records in Japan and immense interest across the world, Murakami Haruki’s literary world needs little introduction. In 2010, tickets to the literary event Verdenslitteratur på Møn immediately sold out when the small literary society, based on a remote island in southern Denmark, welcomed the Japanese author as its guest of honor. Although Murakami had insisted on rules that almost seemed paranoid in a Danish context, we can expect an equally high level of interest when the Danish translation of book 1 of Murakami latest novel 1Q84 is released next week.

From 1982 to 1Q84
After reading only a few lines into 1Q84 it soon becomes evident that this is going to be a different reading experience than Murakami’s other long novels. Aomame, the first of two protagonists we meet, is female and not only very confident, but a cold-blooded serial killer as well. Interesting, right? Especially considering that Murakami’s works have been called a mirror of Japanese patriarchy and that his female characters have irritated some of Japan’s leading feminists who claim Murakami portrays women as objects for male subjectivities. These previous critiques of Murakami’s works may make a necessary point regarding some of his gender representations, perhaps especially those where an older male protagonist has relationships with very young girls, as in Supūtoniku no koibito (1999) [translated as Sputnik sweetheart] and Hitsuji wo meguru bōken (1982) [translated as A wild sheep chase]. However, such criticisms are incomplete because they do not take into account often-overlooked works in his authorship that portray female subjectivities. With the presence of Aomame, these works can no longer be ignored.

Although Murakami is best known for his first person male narrations, 1Q84 is not the first of his works to portray a female main character or question issues regarding women. Beginning with Bāto Bakarakku wa osuki? (1982) [not officially translated], later renamed Mado (2005) [translated as Window], where the male narrator recalls an encounter with a lonely housewife, Murakami has consistently authored a group of works that depicts the reality many women in Japan face. This group creates awareness of women’s issues and portrays protagonists, main characters, and narrators that are female. We can categorize these works into four literary styles: watashi-stories, boku-stories, third person-stories and watashi-tachi-stories.

Four literary styles
Watashi-stories – a female protagonist uses her own voice to narrate her own story via the first person pronoun, watashi (I), as in Nemuri (1989) [translated as Sleep], Kanō Kureta (1990) [not officially translated], Koori otoko (1991) [translated as The ice man] and Midori iro no kemono (1991) [translated as The little green monster]. In the Japanese language, watashi is used both by men and women, but men’s usage is typically limited to formal or polite speech whereas women use watashi in both informal and formal situations. Although some exceptions exist, male protagonists in Murakami’s works usually use boku (I) and not watashi (I) when they reveal their personal stories, and breaking this ‘rule’ often adds an interesting nuance of uncertainty or mystery to the characters.

Boku-stories – using the exclusive male first person pronoun, boku (I), a male narrator retells a female main character’s story as it was told to him, as in Bāto Bakarakku wa osuki?/Mado (1982/2005) [translated as Window], Takushii ni notta otoko (1984) [not officially translated], and Rēdāhōzen (1985) [Lederhosen].

Third person-stories – a third-person narrator narrates the story of a main female character, as in Tairando (1999) [Thailand], Hanarei bei (2005) [translated as Hanalei bay], Shinagawa-saru (2005) [translated as A shinagawa monkey], and most recently in 1Q84 (2009; 2010) [translated as 1Q84, forthcoming October 2011].

Watashi-tachi-stories – the unusual use of the plural pronoun watashi-tachi (we) in Afutādāku (2004) [translated as After dark].

Aomame’s predecessors – Murakami Haruki’s female narrative-works
Consisting of both short stories and novels, this diverse group of Murakami works is not confined to a particular literary style and addresses various political, social and personal issues that women in contemporary Japanese society face. In an article I wrote shortly after book 1 and 2 of 1Q84 was released in Japan, I therefore suggested using the term ‘Murakami Haruki’s female narratives’ to broadly categorize this group of works. The aim was to show that this group of works exists and to demonstrate how the works connect to the ‘female experience’ in contemporary Japan via three distinct themes: ‘housewife isolation’, ‘contemporary femininity’ (contradictive femininity) and ‘women and violence’ (both violence towards the self and towards others).

Aomame’s predecessors are not feminist empowered female characters who stand up for themselves and demand freedom from their female roles. For example, watashi in Nemuri gives up trying to free herself from her family, watashi in Midori iro no kemono re-suppresses her own ‘other self’ through self-harm and Kureta in Kanō Kureta narrates her own murder. But the majority of contemporary (Japanese) women are also not feminist empowered individuals and it is this reality Murakami delicately captures in his female narrative-works.

Against this backdrop of physical violence towards women and female character’s inability to stand up for themselves, 1Q84 is a strange breath of fresh air. Aomame’s organized slaughter of abusive husbands suggests an opposition to the silent witnessing of female victimization. Murakami’s latest female protagonist is different from the main characters in his other female narrative-works. This is evident in the beginning of this complicated story when she symbolically frees herself from the social norms for women by rolling up her tight mini skirt and taking off her high-heeled shoes – two essential contemporary female clothing items that, at least symbolically, restrict women’s mobility.

The mission
Aomame’s mission begins with her crawling down the emergency exit away from a jammed highway where traffic is not moving. The scene where a mother firmly ignores her young daughter’s plea to go outside after witnessing Aomame’s escapade from her car window, suggests that Aomame is the much-needed heroine that can inspire the next generation of girls to find their own “emergency exits”. However, as the novel progresses, it becomes apparent that Aomame herself may be unaware of her own importance.

Although Aomame is Murakami’s first female character to fight in an aggressive way, 1Q84 is not the first work that deals with issues such as violence, isolation and fragmentation that women face in Japanese society. On the contrary, Aomame has evolved from a consistent group of largely ignored female narrative-works that expose the raw realities of female lives. Murakami’s decision to create this determined, strong and violent female character shows an intense frustration over how women are trapped by their female roles. As a group, his female narrative-works delicately express how the conscious recognition of ‘I want out’ is often not enough to induce real change to female lives in contemporary Japan – and in many other societies.

Without revealing any further details about book 1, 2 and 3, I can say this much: I will be among the many queuing to get their hands on book 4 if and when it reaches Japanese bookstores. In the meantime, I look forward to seeing how Danish and English readers receive Aomame and her mission in the peculiar world of 1Q84.

Gitte Marianne Hansen
PhD Student, Japanese Studies,
Department of East Asian Studies,
Faculty of ASian and Middle Eastern Studies,
Cambridge University
Associated PhD Student, NIAS

………………………….

Part of this text was first presented at the annual Japan Studies Association held at Tokai University, Honolulu, Hawaii and later published in:
Gitte Marianne Hansen. 2010. Murakami Haruki’s Female Narratives – Ignored works show awareness of women’s issues. Japan Studies Association Journal Vol. 8.

A series of lectures (in Danish) on Murakami Haruki’s authorship are scheduled this autumn at Københavns Folkeuniversitet in Copenhagen.

Posted in Japan, literature | Tagged | 1 Comment

Six Prime Ministers in 5 years – why Japanese Prime Ministers are so short-lived

Posted on September 6, 2011 by

“What is going in Japan with six prime ministers in five years?” seems to be a frequently asked question these days. In this blog post, I will try to answer this question – or at least shed some light on how we can understand current Japanese politics. We need to understand, firstly, why Kan chose to resign; secondly, why Noda became prime minister; and thirdly, whether or not Noda will last for more than a year.

Why did Kan resign as prime minister?
The short answer is that Kan made a political deal with the leaders of the two opposition parties, LDP and Komeito, to resign in exchange for quick passage of new laws. This only leaves us with more questions and the longer answer is that LDP and Komeito control the Upper House in the Japanese Diet and are thus able to delay the passage of bills for at least 60 days. After 60 days the Lower House can overrule the Upper House’s decision, but only with a two thirds majority (which DPJ with a bit of help from a few other parties are able to). 60 days is a long time in the current situation, where Japan is faced with a tremendous task of rebuilding after the Great East Japan Earthquake, tsunami and nuclear accident at Fukushima. Waiting more than 60 days for passage of new budget for rebuilding and a new energy law would have put a lot of pressure on DPJ from the Japanese people. The voters would understand the DPJ as irresponsible, if nothing happened.

Popular support for Kan and his government was low to begin with due to other political failures, so it was easy for the LDP and Komeito to put Kan under pressure.

But in Japan, you don’t have to be prime minister to have influence over government policies. There are many examples of prime ministers as mere puppets – or mikoshi as the Japanese say referring to the portable shrine used during festivals. The shrine is steered through the streets by the people carrying it. Kan may not be prime minister now, but is still influential as one of those backing Noda.

Kan has left the scene, but only to go back stage. In the eyes of the Japanese, he played the role of the hero – and in Japan the hero often dies fighting to very end to fulfil a greater purpose. Kan argued many times, that the important thing was to pass the extra budget to begin rebuilding and to pass a new bill changing the energy system moving toward renewable energy and separating the authorities regulating the nuclear power plant and the authorities checking the plants.

Why did Noda become prime minister?
In Japan there are two archetypical prime minister. The first is the strong and charismatic leader who is at centre stage clearly articulating politics and direction. The prime ministers of the economic miracle period are usually associated with this type. Only Koizumi from 2001-2006 is a current example. Then there is the weak prime minister controlled by a shadow shogun or at least controlled by the shifting powers of intraparty interests – the infamous factions (or habatsu).

Both types of prime minister share some characteristics. Their strength and duration of time as prime minister depends on first of all, the level of support from the elected incumbents within own party, the level of support from all members of the party, and finally, the level of support from the voters (often filtered through the media).

The DPJ is split between two camps; those behind Ozawa, the former leader of DPJ, grand old man in Japanese politics and founder of several parties. And those not behind Ozawa. When the DPJ incumbents voted for new party president five candidates ran. In the first round no one won majority, but Ozawa’s candidate, Kaieda, was the strongest. In the second round, only Noda and Kaieda ran, and Noda only won, because a majority of incumbents would not like Ozawa to become the next strong shadow shogun, because his politics are too conservative to many. Noda, 54, is young (in Japanese terms) and represents the large group of younger politicians who wants politics to have content and vision – in stead of being about intraparty fighting and tactics.

Noda gained the support of Kan’s faction and also from the popular former foreign minister, Maehara who was one of the five candidates, and Noda was quick to say that he would follow in the footsteps of Kan and continue Kan’s politics – and also pay honour to the deal Kan made with LDP and Komeito to revise DPJ’s political manifesto. Noda has also chosen to give different factions within the DPJ a place in his government.

Will Noda continue the trend of short-lived prime ministers?
So it seems that Noda is already in place firmly tied to the mikoshi with very little manoeuvrability. However, several factors suggest that he might step out of the shadows of Kan and other intraparty and opposition party interests. If he can gain strong support from party members he will be able to win the formal election of party president to be held September 2012. How could he do this? He has already shown himself to be able to create alliances and is currently the best candidate in the eyes of the anti-Ozawa factions. Noda also possesses strong rhetorical skills. He has been training these almost every for the past 24 years by speaking in public at train stations explaining his politics to ordinary Japanese people. He has already demonstrated his ability to speak clearly and using images easy to understand in his inauguration speech. Prime Minister Koizumi was an expert in public speaking and understood how to translate this into political power. Maybe Noda can do the same?

But even though Noda understands intraparty tactics and has remarkable rhetorical skills, he still needs to be able to solve the massive problems Japan face. These include credible and effective rebuilding after the earthquake and tsunami – and control of and long term clean-up after the Fukushima nuclear disaster; the stagnant economy; the fast growing number of elders and smaller and smaller workforce to support paying for pensions and health care; various unsolved international challenges such as an agreement with the USA over Futenma Air Base in Okinawa, Northern islands dispute with Russia, and relations with China just to mention a few. But the biggest challenge by far is the people’s lack of trust in government. And Noda only has one year to convince his own party that he is the best leader to represent the DPJ in the elections for the Lower House to be held in August 2013 at the latest.

The first task is to kick start the Japanese economy through massive rebuilding of the disaster hit region. To finance this, Noda will try to implement a temporary tax and also gradually increase the consumption tax. Whether or not these moves will be seen as unpopular depends on how soon the people will experience real and positive change – and how well they will perceive Noda’s public appearances. We must remember that the low support rates for the past five prime ministers was due to the failure of solving Japan’s problems.

Posted in Elections, government, Japan, politics | 1 Comment

Political blogs in China: the case of Han Han by Jesper Schlæger, PhD Fellow Copenhagen University

Posted on August 12, 2011 by

Introduction
Blogs1 have become a way for people to express personal opinions online, and in China the “blogosphere” is turning into an arena for political debate. This stands in sharp contrast to the Chinese state media which, not surprisingly, usually present the officially acceptable version of social events. Self-censorship among journalists and editors is well-known, and consequently public debate does not really take place in the newspapers or on TV. In that context, the new media with their capability of user generated content provides opportunities for expression of beliefs and values that would previously have remained in the private sphere. To be sure, political blogs bring something new into the public sphere.

What is the role of political blogs in China?
This case study introduces the phenomenon of political blogs through one particular example, namely the blogger Han Han2. His blog has been the most debated political blog in China, and it serves as an extreme case which in the clearest possible way
brings out the new political dynamics. The blogpost printed below can serve as a basis for
discussing the role of political blogging in politics and more specifically if it can be used for
lobbying.
In the “blogosphere” one of the superstars is the mentioned blogger Han Han (韩寒) who was born in 1982. He is first and foremost an author and also a race car driver. He dropped out of high school to pursue a career as writer, and before he started blogging he had already gained fame through his books. His blog is called Twocold and can be found on the Sina-website in the Culture section. It is an extremely popular blog with more than 481 million visits (as of June 2011). The name of the blog refers to his name Han which means “cold”. As the sound is repeated in his name (Hán Hán) it sounds like cold pronounced twice – hence Twocold. Normally, for any single of his blog entries there will be around one million hits and 10-20,000 comments. It is possible for other blogs to present such numbers at special occasions but not for every posting, and so the blog has further
fuelled his celebrity status in China. Even so, he has chosen not to participate in public or media events apart from writing his own blog. Still, this does not stop the tabloid newspapers and magazines from writing about him much in the same way as about any pop-star. In addition to the blog, Han Han has opened his own web-shop, where he sells signed copies of his books. He also edited a magazine called Soloist Ensemble (独唱团) which was only published in one volume and then then authorities put so much pressure on him that the second volume was cancelled.

On the blog he debates many different things such as literature, movies, car racing, and the list continues. There is no topic too big or small to be discussed, but they have a thing in common namely that they somehow address social issues of China today. His initial debates were on the role of literature in society in which he launched fierce and sometimes personal attacks against other writers. In the last few years he has been commenting on just about each and every major social topic. His language resembles spoken language, and often it is ripe with imagery such as when he likens government buildings to prostitutes because of their instantly recognisable style. This brings up another reason for its popularity: There is a strong element of criticism of the political system in his writing.

Han Han’s blog makes political statements which go further than is usually accepted by the
authorities. He questions the fundamental principles of the Communist party-state, the legitimacy of their rule, and the role of citizens. The authorities have a hard time, because the number of followers makes it very difficult to shut his blog down. The fear is that it would create large protests, an unpleasant thing for a government which is generally very concerned with its public image. Han Han’s posts are sometimes initially posted with very critical content, and will hence be ordered removed. In spite of that, before the police orders the original post removed it has already been copied to several other locations and multiply in a way that makes it practically impossible for the censors to do anything about it.

Often, bloggers’ importance are measured by the number of visits or comments, and in Han Han’s case it is obvious that a lot of people regularly read his blog posts. Even so, as is well-known from user produced content websites, the quality of the comments is varying. Let us take the Shame on  Baidu blogpost as a concrete example. This blogpost has 10,127 responses (12 June 2011). The first comments read like this:
Sina Mobile User 2011-03-25 15:28:12:
Go Han Han!!!!!!
56606632 2011-03-25 15:28:19:
No. 1?
Estrella 2011-03-25 15:28:25:
hahaha
Political blogs in China: the case of Han Han
2
Han Han’s Bodyguard From Dongbei 2011-03-25 15:28:25:
haha
If Not Clean Don’t Disturb 2011-03-25 15:28:33:
Invasion of red fruit
Musangma Yeye 2011-03-25 15:28:42:
(A cartoon image of a rabbit)
Estrella 2011-03-25 15:28:47:
So fast, wow!
Radius_Ukiyo 2011-03-25 15:28:47:
Wow
Han Han’s Bodyguard From Dongbei 2011-03-25 15:28:53:
Couch

The first many pages of comments continue in this vein with a number of people commenting on the feeling of being close to Han Han, simply because they post their comment shortly after the original posting. After some time a number of comments get more substantial in relation to the discussion, but the quality of the “debate in the public sphere” can be questioned. Nevertheless, the impact of the blog is only partly to be found in the comments on the blog itself. Equally important is that people read it and take up some of the points in other connections, e.g. on their own blogs. They are inspired by Han Han’s clear and easily understandable statements. Copying, posting links to his blog, using his phrases are all examples of ways his ideas are taken up by “netizens” and through them shape the public discourse. And this is important to notice, because government is to
an increasing extent using netizens’ opinions as a gauge on public opinion.
In conclusion, Han Han’s blog is an illustration of how the Internet has facilitated pluralism in society. This also includes a broadening of the scope and depth of political issues which can be discussed. Through the Internet, bloggers like Han Han gain a medium which can provide them with a very broad base of followers who can make it difficult for government to entirely shut them down. On the other hand, even though Han Han’s blog is often edited by authorities, it is not censored beforehand which means that some of his critical messages and ideas escape to cyberspace before the censors manage to react.
1 The term “blog” comes from web-log and refers to an online chronological publication of thoughts and web-links.
2 Biographical information based on: http://baike.baidu.com/view/5972.htm
Han Han’s blog: blog.sina.com.cn/twocold

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