China in Global Climate Change Politics
Posted: January 18, 2012 Filed under: China, environment, International relations, politics, renewable energy Leave a comment »One of the paradoxes that COP17 left us with to solve is that of how to really understand China as a global climate change player. China has become more and more sure of herself both politically and economically in any global setting. But when it comes to global climate change politics, we see a very careful and non-committing China. At home China is, however, doing quite a lot to transform the Chinese economy from brown growth to green growth as the recent five-year plan revealed as well as the figures for investments in renewables, where China is among the biggest investors in the world and leading in some technologies. Why is it then so difficult for China at the global stage to act more in accordance with national actions? The world would surely welcome it! More than that, the world expects it, and is not late to shame China for any failures in global negotiations as happened after the breakdown of COP15. Here, it is not so important whether or not China was to blame, the point is, that Chinese leaders were very surprised and had a hard time understanding this negative campaigning. At COP16 and COP17 it was clear that China had done a lot to prevent a similar negative campaigning. Chinese public statements about Chinese climate policies has since become very positive and open – but they still sound hollow as only national not global action is taken by China. And the world has become increasingly aware that other important players should also be held accountable for the lack of success in global climate talks; namely the USA, Canada, India and Russia.
Much of the confusion over China can be found in misperceptions over Chinese international policies and priorities. (Communist) China is still a relatively young actor in global politics, and on many issues, the Chinese position seems to be: leave domestic matters for ourselves to work out. A question of classic sovereignty as defined by Morgenthau. Chinese leaders make us believe that China is indeed a unitary actor. So when China is put under international pressure to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and commit to a global legally binding agreement, many fail to understand how fragmented China really is, and how difficult it is for China to undertake a needed transformation from a coal based to a sustainable economy.
And although climate change politics is one of the Chinese leadership’s main concerns, it is primarily a domestic concern related to three interlinked issues; energy security, sustainable economic development, and social stability and progress. China’s primary international concern is, however, to protect China’s sovereignty. Within China there are many diverging interests and understandings of climate change. Regions, cities, Chinese and foreign companies as well as NGO’s each play their different part in China’s economic, social, and environmental development. Officially these non-state actors cannot play a role in Chinese foreign policy, but they are still part of what frames the international understanding that China is becoming greener, because the green actors and the central government have an interest in showcasing their green development – thereby attracting investments or gaining other co-benefits such as better public health.
Other actors in the coal industry and the majority of the production economy dependent on cheap and accessible energy should also be taken into account. These actors protect their vested interests and fight against moving too fast from a brown to a green economy. And coal is still by far the largest energy source in China.
So there are many incentives for the Chinese leaders to present China as green and going green, but it is far harder to achieve, because of the fragmented domestic scene.
The major reason, however, for Chinese lack of global commitment is that an eventual implementation of a global legally binding climate change agreement will clash with priority number one: sovereignty. And it will furthermore have enormous consequences for China’s role in the developing world.
In the global institutional framework being negotiated there is a pressure from most of the developed world, including USA and Canada, to agree on a global standardisation of how to measure and report GHG levels and reductions. The argument is simple and persuasive: If we don’t have the same measures globally we will not be sure that we’re doing enough – we won’t even be sure about what needs to be done. This principle is called MRV – Measure, Report, Validate – and this clashed with the Chinese understanding of sovereignty in such a degree, that China is fighting the principle of MRV with all means. The Chinese leaders all to vividly imagine what the consequences would be, if an international corps of GHG-controllers were allowed to enter China and validate the Chinese statistics with access to even the smallest coal plant and factory. This in itself is not so scary, but the dangers are many; Chinese statistics could be full of mistakes (deliberate or not), which would mean more international shaming, but the biggest danger is that the principle of the international community gaining access to China to validate progress on a certain policy area means that soon enough, human rights would be mentioned as the next area.
A different kind of consequence of a Chinese commitment to a global legally binding agreement is that of a change in definitions of equity. One of China’s main arguments against Chinese commitment is framed as common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) meaning basically that climate change is a global problem and common for all to share the burden, but the developed world must bare the biggest burden and do most since historically and per capita the developed world is more responsible, etc.
China is still aligned with the developing world on this issue. But if China really opened up for discussions on binding commitments, equity and CBDR would have to be reinterpreted; by asking if equity is the same for all developing countries – are there not a substantial difference between the small island states and e.g. China, which would then – more true to China’s economic size and growth rates categorise China as an emerging economy? It would split up the world in many more categories than just the developed and developing countries with a much more differentiated understanding of responsibility than is currently attached to the principle of equity and CBDR.
Furthermore, a China with a different global identity will probably lose her ability to act as a leader of the developing world in international forums like the UN. And China would lose her status as a developing country within the WTO, which would mean losing benefits of subsidies, the ability to keep tariffs. And maybe China would also be more easily pressured into letting the currency float. This is in this light we must understand Obama’s phrasing of China as a grown-up.
So for all these reasons and Chinese imaginations of “what could go wrong”, China is doing what is possible domestically but resisting a global legally binding agreement on fighting climate change.
Lau Blaxekjær
PhD Student
Department of Political Science
Copenhagen University
Elections but no “flower revolution” in Laos
Posted: May 23, 2011 Filed under: China, democracy, development, environment, government, green energy, Laos, politics, renewable energy Leave a comment »By Kristina Jönsson
Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Lund University.
Elections tend to receive a lot of media attention these days—Laos being an obvious exception. Still, in recent months two elections have taken place in Laos, one to the National Assembly (NA) and one to the Party Congress. Even if they by nature do not deliver any major surprises, they still say something about politics in Laos.
The election to the Lao National Assembly was held on April 30. Out of 190 candidates 132 members were elected—all were pre-selected by the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party except five independent candidates. Of the elected members 31.8% were from the government and 68.18% from local authorities (75% were male and 25% female, a bit short of the goal to have 30% women in the Assembly). According to the newspaper Vientiane Times, the election results were quite impressive—99.6% of the eligible voters cast their ballots (!), and the “voters showed great enthusiasm in exercising their political rights to ensure qualified personnel elected to the NA”. In June the National Assembly will formally adopt the new government.
But those being familiar with Lao politics know that the real policymakers were elected already in March at the 9th Party Congress. At the congress 576 delegates represented 191,780 party members nationwide (out of a 6 million population), and they re-elected the 75-year old Choummaly Sayasone—also president of the country—as party secretary general. Members to the Politburo (11) and the Central Committee (61) were also elected. Interestingly, an increasing number of the elected members hold doctoral degrees.
It is quite obvious that the elections, which take place every five years, will not lead to any radical changes in politics or in power dynamics. However, it is expected that a new and younger generation of party technocrats gradually will take over the leadership of the ruling party, which probably will allow for more open discussions. Already now corruption and complaints of inefficient implementation of laws are being publicly discussed. But of course political opposition is still not allowed and media is under state control.
Economic circle in Indochina. Click here for larger picture. Picture by Kristina Jönsson.
A perhaps more significant dimension of Lao politics is the relationship with China and Vietnam. In December 2010, the previous Prime Minister Bouasone Bouphavanh unexpectedly resigned, and Thongsing Thammavong, previously National Assembly president, assumed the post. Some analysts say the change indicated a shift from China towards Vietnam—while others say that would be to miss nuances of Lao politics. There could be some truth in it though, as the presence of China in Laos has increased in recent years through business collaboration and large infrastructure projects but also in other fields, such as education and training. The Lao population has voiced their concern about the “invasion” from the big neighbour in the north, and it is possible that the leadership wanted to address this in some way.
The biggest challenge facing Lao policymakers today is how to develop the country economically. Laos is one of the least developed countries in Southeast Asia, and the aim of the government is to lift Laos from the least-developed nation status by 2020—primarily through selling off natural resources, such as timber, mining and hydropower. At the party congress in March, the party approved measures to “boost” the development (further). Laos has experienced a high economic growth the last few years and is expected to continue this year (7%- 8% GDP growth rate). But many worry about the management of the big influx of foreign investments and about environmental consequences. Take the Xayaburi dam building for example. Laos wants to become “the battery of the region” through the exploitation of hydropower—primarily by selling electricity to Thailand and Vietnam. However, the neighbouring countries, and environmentalists alike, have increasingly challenged this strategy. There are already four dams in China (and four more are planned), but Xayabury would be the first dam to affect the lower Mekong and the consequences are feared to be devastating. A report by the Mekong River Commission, of which Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Thailand are members, states that 23-100 fish species are endangered and consequently also the livelihood and food security of the people in the region, as fish migration will be disrupt. In addition, soil will not reach the presently very fertile Vietnamese Mekong delta. Laos has reluctantly agreed to postpone the construction of the Xayaburi dam after the criticism, but for how long is not clear. The plan is to develop 70 hydro projects, 10 are already in operation and five are under construction—only in Laos!
The pressure on the government is mounting. Economic development is a top priority, but the road towards a higher income level is bumpy. Inequalities are increasing in Laos, even if poverty reduction has been successful at an aggregate level, and the government eventually needs to cater for all people not to loose legitimacy. In other words, the government needs to balance between economic development of the country and the development of its people—and to keep up good relations with the neighbouring countries at the same time. We may not expect any “flower revolution” in a foreseeable future, but that does not mean that there are no (political) changes in Laos. They are just expressed in a more subtle way than in many other places.
Sources:
http://www.vientianetimes.org.la
http://www.voanews.com
http://www.bangkokpost.com
http://www.nwasiaweekly.com
Sydkorea og Danmark danner grøn vækstalliance
Posted: May 13, 2011 Filed under: green energy, renewable energy, South Korea Leave a comment »Af Flemming Ytzen,
Journalist, Politiken og Associate Senior Fellow ved NIAS
For 60 år siden sendte Danmark et hospitalsskib til Den Koreanske Halvø for at hjælpe krigsofre. Her i 2011 kvitterer Korea med at gøre Danmark til partner i et visionært samarbejde om grøn vækst. Det kan betyde nye muligheder for en lang række danske virksomheder med speciale i grønne teknologier og bedre energiudnyttelse.
Med anledning i et netop overstået statsbesøg, hvor den sydkoreanske præsident Lee Myung-bak har været to dage i Danmark, har flere koreanske og danske virksomheder og forskningsinstitutioner benyttet lejligheden til at underskrive samarbejdsaftaler.
Brancheorganisationen Vindmølleindustrien har høje forventninger til et kommende samarbejde med den koreanske søsterorganisation.
‘Danmark har en førerposition inden for vindkraft, og Sydkorea satser rigtig meget på grøn økonomi, så vi vil gerne have så mange danske virksomheder som muligt med til Sydkorea. Det kan betyde, at det er danske virksomheder, der leverer kompetencer og komponenter til koreanske vindprojekter, siger den administrerende direktør i Vindmølleindustrien, Jan Hylleberg.
Det var også de helt store lovord, der kom i brug, da statsminister Lars Løkke Rasmussen (V) og den koreanske præsident, Lee Myung-bak, afsluttede det koreanske statsbesøg 12. maj.
‘Det er en alliance, som vil gavne hele menneskeheden. Det handler om at skabe en lysere, grønnere fremtid sammen’, sagde den koreanske præsident.
Organisationen Dansk Industri ser optimistisk på den nye grønne alliance, der lover jobskabelse i millionstørrelse. En tredobling af dansk eksport til Sydkorea kan være inden for rækkevidde, vurderer afsætningspolitisk chef i Dansk Industri Peter Thagesen.
Frihandelsaftale med EU
De optimistiske fremtidsudsigter skyldes ikke mindst indgåelsen af en frihandelsaftale mellem EU og Sydkorea sidste efterår. Dansk erhvervsliv har med sine styrkepositioner inden for de grønne teknologier, som koreanerne efterspørger, et stærkt udgangspunkt. Kombinationen af en frihandelsaftale og en række klima-og miljøpolitiske satsninger er derfor særlig interessante for betydelige danske virksomheder.
For EU’s aftale med Sydkorea er den mest omfattende aftale, EU nogensinde har forhandlet. Allerede ved ikrafttrædelsen blev der fjernet importtold på europæiske varer for omkring én milliard euro. Norges eksport til Sydkorea blev tredoblet i de tre år efter indgåelse af en norsk-koreansk frihandelsaftale.
Republikken Korea og Danmark deler en ambition om at være frontløbere i et europæisk-asiatisk samarbejde om miljø-og klimapolitik og dermed udviklingen af de grønne arbejdspladser, der spås at blive spydspidsen i det 21. århundredes økonomiske udvikling. Korea vil inden 2020 skabe 1,8 millioner grønne job og næsten 1.000 milliarder kroner i omsætning inden for den teknologi, der populært kaldes cleantech. Det har tænketanken Mandag Morgen opgjort.
Præsident Lee og statsminister Lars Løkke Rasmussen præsenterede under statsbesøget den nye grønne vækstalliance. Nyskabelserne i alliancen er dels et dansk initiativ, Global Green Growth Forum ( 3GF), dels det koreanske Global Green Growth Institute ( GGI). Begge har til formål at inddrage private og offentlige virksomheder og myndigheder i partnerskaber, der fremmer grøn vækst.
Vækstforum
3GF vil blive en årligt tilbagevendende begivenhed i Danmark, og det første Forum afholdes to dage i oktober med deltagelse af 200 af verdens ledende beslutningstagere, der arbejder med udfordringer relateret til grøn vækst – politikere, direktører, investorer og meningsdannere.
Da det ikke lykkedes at indgå bindende klimapolitiske aftaler ud af COP15-topmødet i København i december 2009, gik miljø- og klimapolitikken i stå rent politisk. Men det koreansk-danske initiativ betyder, at private aktører tager over og viser vejen for politiske ledere og erhvervsledere på mange niveauer, kort sagt direktører, forskere, folkevalgte og borgmestre.
Grøn vækst er blevet en national satsning i Korea og nyder støtte i alle dele af samfundet. Hvad enten man taler global klimadagsorden, internationalt samarbejde eller forskning og innovation, markerer Korea sig med en klar grøn profil. Koreansk erhvervsliv har høje ambitioner, når det gælder klima-, miljø-og energirelateret teknologi. Ambitionerne næres af massiv politisk støtte, økonomiske realiteter og en klar overbevisning om, at fremtidens økonomiske vækst er grøn.
Regeringen i Seoul har afsat 700 milliarder dollar over 10 år til en omstilling af landets energi-og miljøinfrastruktur samt til forskning og udvikling, der skal medvirke til at udvikle Koreas grønne konkurrenceevne. Det historisk tætte bånd mellem stat og erhvervsliv sikrer, at alle dele af samfundet bidrager til målet.
Formålet med 3GF er at identificere mulighederne i den grønne industrielle revolution og at bidrage til at accelerere den industrielle omstilling til en miljø-og klimavenlig økonomi. 3GF skal slå bro mellem politik, kapital, virksomheder og teknologi med henblik på at udnytte vækstpotentialet i den grønne revolution. Drivkraften skal være globale privat-offentlige partnerskaber.
3GF vil være en årligt tilbagevendende begivenhed. Første Forum finder sted 11.-12. oktober i København og forventes at få 200 deltagere fra hele verden.
Inden for rammerne af 3GF vil Danmark og Korea invitere internationale virksomheder, investorer, tænketanke og internationale organisationer. 3GF vil i 2011 fokusere på energieffektivitet og vedvarende energi, transport og vand.
Bilateralt samarbejde
Som en del af den nye koreanskdanske vækstalliance er oprettet GGGI, Global Green Growth Institute, der er placeret i den sydkoreanske hovedstad, Seoul. Instituttet er fortsat under opbygning, og den danske regering yder et bidrag på 30 millioner kroner årlig i tre år.
På det bilaterale område vil den koreansk-danske vækstalliance styrke det statslige, kommercielle og institutionelle samarbejde inden for fjernvarme, vindsektoren, sol-og bølgeenergi, biobrændstof og brændselsceller, intelligente energinetværk, vand, hybrid-og elbiler og grøn shipping.
Koreanske industrivirksomheder har sat fokus på forskning og udvikling i områder som vedvarende energi (sol-, bølge- og vind), grønne biler, brændselsceller, energilagring, nanoteknologi LED teknologi, energieffektivitet og intelligente netværk (’smart grids’). I takt med udviklingen kommer en gryende interesse i alle dele af samfundet for energieffektivitet og energibesparelser.
Som eksempler på udviklingen kan nævnes vindindustrien, der er et af områderne hvor sydkoreansk erhvervsliv er på vej frem med hastige skridt. En lang række af de største industrivirksomheder (Samsung, Hyundai, STX, Daewoo, Doosan m.fl.) har investeret betydeligt på området og har udviklet turbiner til hjemme- og eksportmarkedet. Særligt inden for off-shore teknologi er Korea fortsat i en udviklingsfase, hvor danske underleverandører kan byde ind med viden og teknologi.
Indførelsen af en Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) ordning i 2010 giver incitamenter til at udvikle markedet for vedvarende energi i Korea lige så vel som teknologien til at realisere målsætningen. Det gælder primært inden for de prioriterede områder vind- og tidevandsenergi samt brændselsceller, men også biomasse og solenergi. Korea skønnes at være et af de lande, der vil have det hurtigst voksende marked for solenergi.
Korea arbejder på at blive det første land med et fuldt integreret nationalt intelligent netværk og eksperimenterer med etableringen af verdens største smart grid pilotprojekt på øen Jeju. Det statsejede koreanske energiselskab har annonceret investeringer i størrelsesordenen 7,2 milliarder dollar i smart grids frem til 2030. Projektet har indtil videre tiltrukket 10 konsortier, 168 virksomheder, der forventes at investere omkring USD 6 milliarder i projektet i de kommende år.
Af andre prioriterede satsninger i Korea kan nævnes grøn IT, der fokuserer på at minimere energiforbruget forbundet med produktionen og anvendelsen af IT produkter. Dertil kommer hybrid-, elektricitets- og hydrogenbaserede automobiler samt tilknyttet teknologi (batterier etc.), værftsindustrien (grøn shipping), nanoteknologi samt CO2-binding og lagring. Perspektiverne for samarbejde er enorme mellem Danmark og Korea, der kan betegnes som henholdsvis ”first mover” og ”fast mover” når det gælder grøn teknologi.
Det begyndte med Jutlandia…
Relationerne mellem Danmark og Korea begyndte med noget, der havde meget lidt med økonomi at gøre. Børnebørnene efter den generation, der husker erfaringerne fra Koreakrigej og hosåpitalsskibet Jutlandia, vokser i dag op i et land, der er blandt verdens førende inden for uddannelse, fladskærme, mobiltelefoner, skibsbyggeri og biler.
Med en gennemsnitlig årlig vækst på 9 procent er Sydkoreas nationalprodukt nu på højde med Italiens og New Zealands. Så sent som i 1970′ erne var landet modtager af dansk udviklingsbistand, sidste år blev landet medlem af donorernes klub i OECD.
Hvordan har det kunnet lade sig gøre? Uddannelse, uddannelse og uddannelse, men er det bare pisken, der er blevet brugt i klasseværelserne?
Det er en udfordring for vor egen måde at tænke udvikling på, men forklaringen er primært civilisatorisk: Den koreanske dreng eller piges fundamentale æresbegreb er kungfutsiansk: Du ærer kun dine forældre ved at vise din flid, dygtighed, evne og vilje til at forberede din og andres fremtid til noget bedre end det, de kom fra.
Flemming Ytzen (f. 1952) har arbejdet som journalist siden 1976, fra 1994 på Politiken. Han kommenterer asiatisk udvikling og politik på TV2 News og er en hyppigt anvendt foredragsholder. Læs mere på: http://flemmingytzen.wordpress.com
