What does the Bo Xilai scandal tell us about China’s political system?

Posted on May 10, 2012 by

A little more than a year ago, I offered an analysis on this blog of the likelihood that the color revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa would trigger a similar movement in China (http://infocus.asiaportal.info/2011/03/02/blogsin-focus2011marchare-flower-revolutions-middle-east-and-north-africa-endangering-stability/).

One year later, the Chinese one-party regime is once more facing challenges, and once again it is a matter of debate how severe these challenges are. This time, regime stability is endangered not by social unrest among the alienated mass public, but by divisions within the ruling elites themselves. As a large body of scholarship on regime change dynamics shows, regime disintegration far more often results from splits among the ruling elite than from popular protests. A united leadership can weather even severe public opposition, but elite splits can cause the collapse of a regime even in the absence of popular challenges to its leadership.

Once more, I think that this crisis will pass and leave the one-party regime intact–in all likelihood, it has already passed. Nevertheless, this is a good time to take stock of what we know about the “Bo Xilai scandal” and examine its significance. I will sum up the various interpretations of the fall of Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai who, before his dismissal, had been slated for a seat on China’s topmost political decision-making body, the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). These accounts, which mostly focus on the actors involved and their individual interests and provide explanations specifically pertaining to the leadership change scheduled for this fall, are widely compatible. Based on these accounts, I draw on established theories of autocratic regime maintenance to more generally highlight what this event tells us about the state of China’s political system.

THE EVENT

I will start with the facts as they are known to the public. The affair started with a fall-out between Bo Xilai and Chongqing police chief Wang Lijun, who had fled the city dressed as a woman and sought refuge in the Chengdu consulate of the United States. After leaving the embassy, Wang was escorted to Beijing by agents of the Ministry of Public Security. He has not been heard of since then. In March, Bo Xilai was first removed from his posts in Chongqing, and one month later dismissed from the Politburo on account of “serious discipline violations”. The Bo family is being investigated for corruption, and Bo Xilai’s wife, Gu Kailai, is facing charges of manslaughter. Allegedly, Wang Lijun carried information that Gu Kailai killed Neil Heywood, a British businessman with close connections to the Bo family.

Given the proximity of this event to the leadership transition planned for late 2012 and the scarcity of reliable information about what triggered these events and how they unfolded, speculation about what really happened and what it all means is rife. The fact that the breaches of discipline Bo allegedly engaged in have not been detailed by the government, and that unverified details are added to the story on a daily basis, allows for a range of possible explanations.

 

POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS

The most commonly accepted explanation, both within China and abroad, is that of a power struggle between different factions within the CCP, notably between the “Princelings”, i.e. descendants of famed revolutionaries, and politicians formerly associated with the CCP’s Youth League. According to rumor, a clique of politicians around former President Jiang Zemin have allied with the princelings. The deeper meaning of this explanation is that the procedures of leadership transition in China are less institutionalized than we believed.

Another explanation focuses more on individuals than on groups and claims that Bo Xilai teamed up with the CCP’s topmost security official Zhou Yongkang, to not only elate Bo into the PBSC, but to install him as Zhou’s successor as head of the Central Political and Legislative Committee. As China’s security apparatus has grown increasingly powerful in the last years, this explanation suggests that CCP hardliners attempted a soft coup against moderate forces within the Party. Rumors of an actual coup attempt in March, and further rumors that Bo eavesdropped on President Hu Jintao continue to keep this hypothesis alive.

A third explanation is centered on the challenge that Bo Xilai’s popularity posed for the institution of collective leadership. In contrast to the members of China’s top decision-making body, Bo Xilai has great charisma, and has gained fame not only for his hard stance against organized crime, but also for reviving Maoist traditions and for implementing pro-poor policies. This has made him popular to the extent that charges of populism and egotism were leveled against him. Shortly before Bo was sacked, Premier Wen Jiabao delivered an unusually emotional speech, warning against leftist tendencies in the Party. Though not mentioning him by name, it is clear that this speech, which also pointed out that such policies marked the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, was directed against Bo Xilai.

A fourth explanation, the one least popular with observers, is the official one: Bo Xilai is guilty of breaching the law, not more and not less. All candidates for a seat on the PBSC are subject to thorough background checks, and it is claimed that in this process evidence of corruption surfaced. This explanation, though hardly credible – Bo had been in the Politburo for some time and would have undergone a background check before being admitted to this elite organization – is favored by the officials as it makes the Party look strong instead of weak: the rule of law is upheld, and dirty elements are filtered out. By extension, it suggests that corruption is not systemic, but confined to individuals, upholding the image that the CCP’s leadership stratum is generally free of corruption and that people like Bo are an exception rather than the rule.

SIGNIFICANCE

Different as these explanations are, they have one thing in common: with the exception of the official position, all other accounts interpret this episode as a power struggle in the run-up to the 18th Party Congress. Observers have long been divided over the question if China’s leadership transition is formalized and institutionalized, according to political scientists an important precondition for regime stability, and this episode seems to confirm the position of the skeptics.

While not directly challenging this position, I would like to argue for a more refined stance. If we understand institutionalization as establishing formal or informal rules to regulate a process or an outcome that are widely known and commonly followed, we will find that the process of selecting the new leaders is not institutionalized, but leadership change itself is: although both the previous transition from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao and the present transition from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping have been mired in factionalist struggles, Jiang eventually yielded the reins of power to Hu, and Hu, after the specified ten years, will yield them to Xi. This process might have been disorderly, but the transition itself has never been in question. In a related manner, one might argue that by removing Bo, the collective leadership eliminated a threat to its existence and thus proved that it is functioning better than might be assumed.

While it is tempting to relate the Bo Xilai scandal merely to the issue of leadership succession, I see additional significance elsewhere. In my opinion, this episode highlights a fundamental problem in the Chinese political system: it is in need of reforms too far-reaching to be tackled within the present leadership setup. This results from a fundamental paradox in the consolidation of authoritarian regimes: in order for an autocracy to survive, leadership change needs to be institutionalized. On the other hand, however, the more the mechanisms for picking successors from one’s own ranks become institutionalized, the less likely it is for persons with very different policy outlooks to enter the leadership stratum. In China, not the incoming, but the outgoing leaders decide on policy directions, and these directions are always the result of a compromise. In my opinion, Bo Xilai’s character and policies appealed to those who would like to see a more decisive approach not only to the fundamental problems China is currently facing, but also to how China is governed. Hence, Bo’s rise challenged not only the current leadership’s incremental approach to solving China’s problems, but also the institution of collective leadership itself. Therefore, the episode signifies more than simply a recurring struggle for leadership – it is the result of an inflexible struggling to muster enough strength to cope with major problems without changing the status quo.

This requires some explanation. While Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, and to a lesser degree Jiang Zemin, wielded considerable power in deciding the direction of Chinese politics, their successors are far weaker in this regard. Hu Jintao needs to subject himself to the decisions collectively made by the nine-member PSBC, and this will most likely not be different for Xi Jinping. More importantly, the outgoing leadership has already decided the main policies for the coming years. Arguably, this causes policies to be far more cautious and less far-reaching than before. This situation is rendered even more difficult by the fact that governing China has become increasingly complex.

As a result, it has become very challenging to make fundamental changes both within and to the established decision-making routines. Most observers agree that endemic corruption and the influence of special interests on policy-making hinders the solution of problems like income inequality, environmental pollution and the protection of intellectual property rights, all of which need to be addressed for China’s economic growth to continue. Whereas the current leadership has, so far without much success, attempted to reform this increasingly sclerotic system from within, Bo Xilai promised radical alternatives to these piecemeal reforms and thereby challenged the existing system.

Bo’s charisma and the policies he implemented in Chongqing appealed to a Chinese public that has become increasingly cynical about politics; his style promised a change from the dry technocratic reign of the “nine engineers”, as the PBSC was often dubbed, to a more hands-on and deceivingly simple approach to solving the nation’s severe problems. By their nature, Bo’s charisma and his populist approach to politics stood in direct contradiction to the prevailing impersonal model of collective leadership, and his ouster might very well stem from the realization among the technocrats in the PBSC that the carefully balanced system of collective leadership is likely to be rocked if Bo should ascent into the Party’s highest decision making body. If the stories about Bo’s egocentrism, cruelty, lack of compassion and dictatorial work-style that have recently been lanced in the press are true, this concern was well-founded. However, while this provides additional justification for his removal, one of course wonders why such a dangerous man has been able to make it even this far.

Though certainly not an indicator of the imminent collapse of one-party rule in China, this episode nevertheless marks a crucial moment in Chinese politics. For the first time, the major reforms that are undoubtedly necessary will not be pushed through by a small number of strong individuals, but need to be engendered by collective fiat. On the one hand, the moment seems fortuitous: the current shake-up presents a unique chance to implement reforms that make the system more responsive to public demands. This will be more difficult as politics turn back to normal. On the other hand, however, it is unclear who exactly should seize this opportunity, as the Bo episode conveyed a very clear signal that too much personal initiative can be dangerous. In the absence of reform, power can always be maintained by repression and the control of public opinion. Either option, within-system reform and repression, has proponents in the current leadership, and it is utterly uncertain onto which path the new leadership will embark.

Christian Göbel
Senior Lecturer
Department of Political Science, Lund University

Posted in China, democracy, government, politics | Leave a comment

What is happening in Korea? by Gabriel Jonsson

Posted on April 17, 2012 by

During the past week, South Korea held parliamentary elections whereas North Korea made a failed missile test and celebrated the 100th anniversary of the nation’s founder, eternal President Kim Il Sung (1912-1994).

In the April 11 elections, the ruling Saenuri party won 152 of 300 seats in the 300-member National Assembly. The main opposition party, the Democratic United Party, received 127 seats. Although it is difficult to predict the impact on the presidential elections to be held in December, the chances of Park Kun-hye, the daughter of former President Park Chung Hee (1963-1979), to become the ruling party’s candidate could have improved. Politics will increasingly focus on the elections, which means that it is unlikely that anything dramatic will happen in domestic politics or in inter-Korean relations throughout the year.

Since North Korea announced on March 16 that it will make a missile test between April 12-16 to commemorate the 100th anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birthday on April 15, there has been much concern regarding the announcement world-wide. The test was made on April 13 but it was a big failure: the rocket crushed into the sea just one minute after it was launched. Considering that the launch not only concurred with the commemoration of Kim Il Sung’s birthday but also was intended to strengthen the new leader Kim Jong-Un’s position, the crash was very embarrasing for the leadership. The North Korean authorities have admitted the failure and initiated investigations to find out the causes. It cannot be excluded that the failure will have an impact on power politics within the ruling Korean Worker’s Party (KWP).

At the military parade held in the capital Pyongyang on April 15, the leadership showed up in front of tens of thousands of citizens in order to show unity. The appointment of Kim Jong-Un as first secretary of KWP and chairman of the Central Military Commission on April 11 followed by the appointment as first chairman of the powerful National Defence Commission on April 13 clearly shows that the North Korean leadership wants to maintain status quo. This wish also became clear when Kim Jong-Un declared that the ”military-first” policy pursued by his father Kim Jong Il (1942-2011) will be enhanced.

Since the 1950s, North Korea has always emphasized the juche idea of self-reliance in politics, economics and defense, but the missile test is an indication that this policy has contributed to make the country backwards in terms of military technology. The admission of the failure shows that there is awareness of the backwardness within the party, but whether the failure will cause fissures or not is an open question. Considering that there since the struggle for power within the party ended in the late 1950s have been no known signs of fissures within the party, it is hard to expect that such a situation will develop now.

On the other hand, one difference now is that the legitimacy of power for a third generation Kim is weaker than for his predecessors. In fact, Kim Jong-Un’s only source of legitimacy is being son of Kim Jong Il, but how long will that impact last? What will happen if he cannot bring the country out of its economic difficulties that to a large extent are caused by the huge military expenditures? We do not know yet by sure how firm grip he has on power, but even if Korean politics is characterized by one-man rule the leader must have trusted advisers around him. Could the failed test cause distrust among his closest people?

North Korea is in contrast to what was the case in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe  extremely isolated from the outside world which makes it virtually impossible to change the system from outside. Domestic pressure for a change is at the present out of the question but should fissures arise within the leadership, along with disunity within the powerful military, an unpredictable situation could develop in the country.

Gabriel Jonsson

Associate Professor Korean Studies, Stockholm University

Posted in Elections, Korea, nuclear weapons, politics | Leave a comment

One Year On: A Symposium Commemorating ‘311’, the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011

Posted on March 29, 2012 by


On 8th March, the Alexandersalen was the venue for the symposium ‘One Year On: A Symposium Commemorating ‘311’, the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011’. The event was held with Danish scholars on Japan and Japanese scholars working in Denmark, who had the desire to do something from Denmark for Japan as people prepared to commemorate the first anniversary of the catastrophe that claimed so many lives. More than 70 participants with various backgrounds came to the symposium, including those travelling from Japan and Sweden. I participated in the event as one of the organizers as well as the panel discussants.

The goal of the symposium was not to make a ‘grand theory of 311’ but to commemorate the first anniversary of the event. Professor Takashi Suganuma (Rikkyo University & Roskilde University) reflected this by opening the symposium with one-minute’s silence. Dr. Geir Helgesen (Nordic Institute of Asian Studies) followed with his opening speech, referring to the shock the world felt as it watched the footage of the Tsunami on the news, as for many Japan was known to be one of the most prepared nations for natural disasters.

The afternoon’s proceedings begun with Professor Chiharu Takenaka (Rikkyo University, Japan), talking about ‘Reflecting on a year since 311’. Her lecture offered a broad overview of what the Japanese people learned from 311, touching upon the monthly workshop she and her colleagues at Rikkyo University have conducted since 311 to share experiences with students, NGOs, journalists and afflicted local communities. Takenaka mentioned key developments in Japanese society, such as changes in Japan’s relations with US, China and South Korea as people received assistance from them during and after the Great Earthquake. She also pointed out that there were drastic changes in the Japanese people’s views on individuals vis-a-vis communities, democracy, risk, as well as Japan’s position in Asia. She concluded by saying that it is going to be a long process for the people in Japan to integrate the experiences and lessons learned from the Great Earthquake but as Sakura (cherry blossom) in Rikuzen Takata (one of the most severely hit areas) managed to bloom shortly after the Earthquake, people are slowly but surely beginning the process of recovery.

In the first panel discussion, moderated by Professor Toshiya Ozaki (Rikkyo University & Copenhagen Business School), the civil engineering dimension of 311 was taken up. In ‘When one says safe enough and others disagree’, Dr. Kazuyoshi Nishijima (DTU) introduced the basics of risk evaluation. He explained how risks are assessed from an engineering point of view and how that was (or was not) implemented in cases such as Tsunami and Fukushima nuclear plants. Nishijima also explained the thinking called ‘yet still probabilistic thinking’, which he believed should be used much more often to help societies make decisions through calculating how they could optimally allocate limited resources available. Nishijima’s lecture was particularly interesting as it made the audience realize how we, on a day-to-day basis, chose to ignore the possibilities of fatal accidents. Then followed Dr. Anni Greve’s presentation (Roskilde University) ‘Coping with the incalculable: Tokyo after the Great East Japan Earthquake’. Greve spoke about how Tokyo had managed to rebuild itself after several events of massive destruction in the past. Greve found that Tokyo’s unique capabilities to handle serious crises were seen again after the Great Earthquake through her analysis on the professional groups that engaged in the reconstruction process, such as architects, the mayor of Fukushima, school teachers and firemen. She concluded that the effects of 311 are cross-continental, suggesting this as one indication of the process of ‘cosmopolitanization’, as defined by Ulrik Beck.

The second panel discussion was about the civil society dimension of 311, which was moderated by Dr. Mika Yasuoka (ITU & Kyoto University, Japan). In ‘The Great East Japan Earthquake: Japan as an Aid Recipient’, Dr. Aki Tonami (myself) talked about how Japan, which has been mostly known as an aid donor rather than a recipient, experienced and viewed the Great Earthquake, both from the view point of the government and the Japanese NGOs. Overall, the Japanese government and NGOs were very grateful for the assistance offered from abroad. At the same time, they faced operational and institutional difficulties, which could be unique to a developed country that was suddenly put in a position of needing help. Dr. Annette Hansen (Aarhus University) backed this by her notes on postings to the Facebook site for the alumni of AOTS (The Association for Overseas Technical Scholarship) and JICA (The Japan International Cooperation Agency) training courses in Japan in the aftermath of the Earthquake. Her main findings from her presentation ‘Responses to the 2011 Triple Catastrophe on Facebook’ were the number and the nature of messages posted on the Facebook site changed over time as the aftermaths of the Great Earthquake revealed themselves, and Facebook was used as a space for reaching out from and to Japan for those who had once received training in Japan.

Interesting points were raised during discussions among the panellists and with the floor throughout the symposium. One of the audience pointed out the biggest difference between the Great Hanshin Earthquake in 1995 and the Great East Japan Earthquake was that use of the Internet – because of that, people’s accessibility to information was naturally much more improved this time around. Another audience member suggested that, while expats living in Tokyo became much more involved in the Japanese society after the 311, Japan has not yet managed to recover its image as so many foreigners left Japan after the nuclear incident. How the nuclear accident has been dealt with and the future of Japan’s energy policy were also questioned.

This last point was indicative of a symposium, which illuminated that, even though one year has passed, it is not ‘over’ yet and the reconstruction process has just begun. The range of presentations and discussions covered reminded me once more of the variety of issues that Japan faced (or is still facing) as a direct consequence of the events of 311.

 

Aki Tonami
Researcher, NIAS
More information

 

Posted in catastrophes, earthquake, Japan, reconstruction, tsunami | 1 Comment

A brief report from a Burma visit 13-21 February 2012

Posted on March 13, 2012 by

Mikael Gravers, Aarhus University

The situation:

On the surface there is a more relaxed mood in Rangoon when I visited Burma. However, all agree that the old totalitarian system is still working. People are still arrested during the night. Thus, we are cautioned that the situation could change rapidly again after the by-elections.

There is a struggle in the government and the parliament between hardliners and reformists. The reformist are the President U Thain Sein and the Speaker of the parliament Thura Shwe Man. Recently they proposed to appoint village head men and other local officials by elections. This was rejected by the lower house. Headmen and other officials are appointed by the military. Thus, it is part of the social security for retired officers.

The president has not been able to stop the fighting in Kachin State. The army is not under government control according to the constitution. Arrests of individuals who criticize the army continues. The leader of the “Saffron Revolution” 2007, U Gambira, who was released recently, is in confrontation with the State Sangha Council who has warned him that he will end up in court accused of illegally entering his monastery, defaming the Sangha elders, and assisting the monk Ashin Pyinna Thiha who was evicted for making a political speech in the office of the National League Democracy (NLD), and for meeting Hilary Clinton. Monks are not allowed to act politically. Thus, freedom is still limited. U Gambira, who was dis-robed by soldiers and sentenced 63 years in jail in 2007, entered his monastery last month. The Maggi  monastery had been sealed by the army after the raid in 2007. U Gambira found all the destruction and blood left from the violent raid. He is now accused of illegally breaking into the monastery.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD have been hackled during their election campaign by the USDP (Union Solidarity Development Party – the ruling party). USDP promised new roads to the voters and tried to impose a ban on the NLD using stadiums for their rallies. She is often prevented from using stadiums for her rallies. In villages near the capital Naypyitaw, officials told villagers that their electricity supply would be cut if they attended an NLD rally with Daw Suu Kyi However, Daw Suu Kyi draws huge crowds on her tour. NLD may take more than half of the 48 seats in the by-elections provided there is no fraud.

Thein Sein focus on the education of the young, and Rangoon University will be reopened in the near future. He said that the young ethnics should replace weapons with computers. One blogger ironically wrote the president and asked for a laptop. The mood is relaxed and cautiously optimistic, although the opposition is rather skeptical about the real intentions of the government. They say that relative freedom is about having the sanctions lifted and otherwise let the army stay in control behind the parliament.

Many international NGOs are ready to let big money flow into development projects and humanitarian aid. This can corrupt more than benefit those who are in need if it is not well prepared and sustainable. There is an over idealized view of the conditions. The old system is still in place and working – or rather not working unless ordered from the top. Bureaucrats are officers – they dare not act without clear orders from the absolute top. And since messages from the top are now blurred for and against, they do nothing! The frame laws are not resulting in specific laws on for example censorships,  the use of ethnic languages in education, investments and financial regulations. There is no rule of law yet.

The Karen:

The focus in following is mainly on the situation in the Karen State as related to the overall political changes. It is based on a very brief visit and the analysis is very preliminary:

The main stakeholders in the conflict(s)are:

  • Tatmadaw, Karen National Union and its Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA), Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), Border Guard Force (BGF), The Phloung-Sgaw Democratic Party (Karen State), Karen Peace Council (Timothy Laklem), Padoh Aung San and his Peace Force, plus minor groups  of armed persons as well as the government represented by Aung Min (railway minister), Aung Thaung head of Union Solidarity Development Party (the ruling military party) and the final peace negotiations, and Saw Min, PM Karen State.[1]

The ceasefire in Hpa-an in January 2012 between Aung Min and the KNU delegation is obviously only an initial step towards a more realistic agreement. The impression from a two hour discussion with David Tharckabaw (Vice-President, KNU) before we came to Burma is that the KNU leadership is suspecting a Burmese trap. Tharckabaw and the hardliners of KNU seems to have rejected the agreement and there is a deep split within the KNU. Tharckabaw talked about the Karen being cheated so often by ‘ Bamah’ (ethnic Burmans). He also rejected the ‘developmentalism’ of the government. Development in their version, he said, means to take the resources from the Karen State and not real development for the Karen population. He claimed this ‘developmentalism’ is supported by Germany and other EU countries. He also blamed Harn Yawnghwe and the Ethnic Nationalities Council (ENC) of supporting this line.[2] This indicates that there is a split among the pan-ethnic organizations, although they seem to agree on a federal constitution. Tharckabaw is in the leadership of United Nationalities Federal Council, another pan-ethnic organization of the armed ethic groups. He dislikes ENC and Harn. But he seems to support Daw Suu Kyi’s strategy: ‘She won’t betray the trust of her people’.

To add to the complexity of the situation, the Karen Peace Council (KPC) under former KNU General Htein Maung and Dr. Timothy Laklem signed a peace agreement in Naypyitaw (7th. February) with minister Aung Thaung and the Union-level peace negotiating team.[3] He arranged a meeting with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi 10th. February to the deep frustration of the KNU and many Karen in Rangoon, because he posed as the front representative of the Karen. Aung Thaung thus undermined the efforts of Aung Min who negotiated with the KNU. It is also a clear sign that The NLD and Daw Suu Kyi need much more information about the ethnic situation, its complex political structure and its many actors. Lack of precise information on the ethnic situation can easily generate more mistrust. Many Karen still generalize in their mistrust towards all Bamah. Daw  Suu Kyi again referred to ‘The Spirit of Panglong’ during her tour in the Kachin State. This creates hope – but Panglong was a weak and incomplete agreement and there is a need for a specific political program.

The day after we left – 22nd. of February -, DKBA under commanders Saw Lah Pwe and Po Bi near Mying Gyi Ngu were attacked by the BGF – probably the group  commanded by Thong Hlaing. BGF took some of DKBA’s position and weapons. This group infringes upon the supporters of U Thuzana and does not respect the monk.[4] They drink, eat meat harass his followers and take taxes along U Thuzana’s new highway built with donations from large Thai food companies. U Thuzana had managed to establish some sort of a civil administration via his monks and lay followers. This structure could be dismantled by the BGF and the army if there is no general agreement between all groups.

In Hpa-an, the Phloung-Sgaw Democratic party left an impression of being a serious and concerned player. They have submitted questions from a Karen delegation (Kawkareik) to the local Hlutaw (parliament) about landmines and their removal. The party has a mentor (founder?), the monk Ashin Pyinya Thami, (Taungkalae) who is Mon-Chinese. He has been able to obtain large donations for a college, although it is not yet completed. He delivered a strong criticism of the generals, the NLD – “she wants to ‘burmanize’ the ethnic groups”. “She is like her father.” U Thuzana was dismissed: “he only collects money (and built zedis) for himself – proud of himself”- (It sounds as jealousy). “The 2007 monks demonstrations was a Bahma trick”, he said. Pyianya Thami is said to have direct line to Than Shwe’s wife who has supported him. In my analysis, he is a charismatic empire builder, but not a reliable political player.

Further, the Hpa-an Karen Student Association represents an important democratic segment. The town is however totally dominated by the 22nd. light infantry division and the BGF, although most of the mentioned groups including the NLD have a presence in Hpa-an.

Land confiscation is a huge problem in the Karen State (as elsewhere). The Karen complained that they also lost their commons for grazing animals, collecting firewood and leafs for thatching. This is probably the most urgent problem to deal with. A law is badly needed. Most of the confiscated land is now huge rubber plantations.

The ceasefire agreement between KNU delegation and Aung Min in Hpa-an was rejected by the KNU leadership. A new meeting took place in Chiang Mai, 2nd March. Both sides agreed to meet in April. Significantly, the government delegation included business people. This underlines the KNU fear that ceasefire is mostly about quick economic deals more than genuine peace and reconciliation.

The PM of the Karen State Hlutaw, Saw Min (a former officer), seems to be very conservative and a military man. He is seen as one who supports the BFG.

For a future peace to be established, an initial reduction of the army as well as a repositioning of all armed groups within a few scheduled and monitored areas is necessary!

Concluding remarks:

  • Lack of trust is a main problem, I believe, in all camps. It is without meaning if the government only negotiates with the KNU – all groups should come to the table and the agreement must be detailed – especially in relation to monitoring and conflict resolution if or rather when future disagreements erupt. In the situation, a neutral facilitator could be an idea if all agree on the selected persons/organization.
  • Trust and reconciliation work together. There should be a forum where the various Karen groups, their leaders/commanders could meet regularly with government representatives and local army officers and exchange information, share news and have informal discussions. This is a way of establishing mutual knowledge, recognition and trust. It takes time – long time!
  • Soldiers need a livelihood after a peace. But to offer money in order to persuade them to give up their weapons is to ignore the core political reasons to take up arms in the first place. Here is a huge task for NGOs to reintegrate thousands of fighters( this is closely related to de-mining programs).
  • The NLD need a detailed political assessment and project for the ethnic case. It could be an idea to have an All Burma Conference, round table, with all political parties, the government and all ethnic groups/organizations. It is a huge task to organize such a meeting. But the complexity needs to be addressed.

[1] KNU is the main Karen organization, largely Christian dominated; DKBA the Buddhist Karen in the Karen State, followers of the  monk U Thuzana; DKBA broke away from the KNU in 1994 but they work together now. BGF is the part of DKBA who joined the army in 2010. The other minor groups are small and are splinter groups follwing one leading person.

[2] ENC is a pan-ethnic organization working for a federate state in Burma. Harn Yawnghwe is the head of the Burma office in the EU. He supported the National Democratic Front party who broke out of the NLA and joined the elctions in 2010. Thus he is not popular with the NLD or the KNU.

[3] He is a hardliner and said to be the organizer of the violent attack on Daw Suu Kyi in 2004. He will have the final word in future peace agreements, as far as we understand.

[4] U Thuzana is a highly respected Karen monk who uses large donations (from Burma and Thailand) to built not only pagodas but schools clinics and roads in the Karen state

Posted in Burma, democracy, government, Human rights, Karen, minorities, Myanmar, politics | Leave a comment

A little tale about lies by Anya Palm

Posted on March 1, 2012 by

“The neighborhood of Dey Krahorm has never received a social land concession.”

This was the words of Cambodian Information Minister His Excellency Khieu Kanharith when I last visited him for an interview. About a week ago.

But let´s go back a little. Let´s go back to May 2003. Prime Minister Hun Sen gives a speech in which he declares his intention of upgrading 100 poor neighborhoods every year, until all of Cambodia´s urban poor has secure land tenure and full basic services. All the neighborhoods are granted a social land concession. A social land concession means that the state gives the land to the people living on it.

The promise is much needed. In 2003, the South East Asian Kingdom is only a few years away from political instability, frequent guerilla attacks and Khmer Rouge strongholds that just won´t give in.

As a consequence, there is an overwhelming amount of poor people and in addition – a high number of slum dwellers.

Many of them live in the country´s capital, Phnom Penh. The neighborhood of Dey Krahorm, the one the Minister is talking about, is a poor neighborhood just exactly in the midst of the city. This is, of course, quite fortunate for the 805 families living in the community – they can easily earn a living by driving a motorcycle taxi or sell goods on the market.

In his speech in May 2003 Prime Minister Hun Sen names four urban neighborhoods that are to be the first ones to be upgraded. Dey Krahorm is mentioned. Posters are put up in the neighborhood, informing the residents and a decree from the Council of Ministers certifies it. Ironically, most Dey Krahorm does not actually need it, because they already own the land, they live on. But nevertheless, a social land concession is a good thing to have.

And then…things take an unfortunate turn.

In 2005 suddenly a company makes its entrance in the lives of the people of Dey Krahorm. Construction company 7NG has now – without the knowledge or consent of the residents – made a deal with 35 village representatives to swap the land of Dey Krahorm for a strip of land 20 kilometers outside of the city.

Of course, one cannot sell what one does not own, so the agreement with the company is illegal and invalid. The residents are entitled, not only to remain on their land, but to have it upgraded. The Prime Minister promised them this.

There are absolutely no legal grounds to argue otherwise. None.

But then the intimidation begins.

Now the residents of Dey Krahorm experience theft, sudden fires, destruction of their property frequently. Over the next four years, this practice increases to the point where many of the villagers give up, take the meager compensation offered to them and leave. The ones that doesn´t? They get charged with trumped up charges and has to go to court so frequently, they cannot do their everyday job. They get threatened. They get beat up.

And then one day:

The excavators come.

Early in the morning January 24, 2009, the villagers are awakened by the sounds of their houses being torn down. An army of military police, police officers and company workers have sealed off the area and are aggressively beating down everyone, who steps in their way.

There is one man, who with his palms together raised in the air begs for the chance to go inside his own house and salvage a few of his belongings, while the excavator driver ignores him and carries on. A few moments later, a police officer comes with a fire extinguisher and sprays the praying man straight in his face to get him to move away.

One woman stands on top of the rubble trying to stop the excavator when she loses her balance and falls down under it. Shocked bystanders believe they just saw her die until they see her crying daughter carry her out and get her to a hospital.

In a few hours, the neighborhood is nothing but rubble. Half an hour later, then-Deputy Governor Mann Chouen holds a press conference on the site. Undistracted by the scenery behind him, and of what just happened, he congratulates the police and company workers on the operation.

Meanwhile the families from Dey Krahorm are on their way to the relocation site 20 kilometers from the city, a place they clearly and lawfully refused to move to. And no wonder. Everything out there is inadequate. In-adequate schools for the children, in-adequate hospitals too far from the residents, in-adequate sanitation, water, food…and for jobs? Well, there is a factory out there. It´s owned by the company that took their land.

So – I was in Phnom Penh to see what had happened Dey Krahorm since that day in 2009.

Nothing, really. A lot of the families had gotten a lot more complicated stories to tell now, but very few of them had gotten any better. Many were sick. Many were jobless. All were poor.

And the lucrative land of Dey Krahorm itself? There is a 7NG office there now, but I was not allowed to go in. Instead, I went up to say hello to the Minister and spokesperson for the Cambodian Government to ask him about the Dey Krahorm case. I asked him, why the Cambodian government has not kept their promise about upgrading the communities they had given social land concessions.

You already know what he answered.

“The neighborhood of Dey Krahorm has never received a social land concession.” Wish-wash.

But Mann Chouen – the then-Deputy Governor of Phnom Penh, who held the press conference on the rubble…he received a medal for his work on Dey Krahorm.

Facts:

Land grabbing is the biggest problem in Cambodia today. It affects about one million people every year. According to the Cambodian Land Law of 2001, people who have been living on a strip of land for five years have the right to ownership. It also states that if land is to be used for other purposes, the residents are entitled to a “fair” compensation. A common land grabbing scenario is selling a piece of land to a foreign company, who then removes the residents living there – like they did with the people of Dey Krahorm. In 2011, the Cambodian Government sold 800,000 hectare of land to foreign companies – in 2010, this number was 200,000 hectare.

Anya Palm
Freelance journalist based in Bangkok
www.parlmwritings.com 

Posted in cambodia, corruption, democracy, Human rights, politics, poverty, refugees, urban development | Leave a comment

Contemporary Buddhist Revival in Kalmykia: Survey of the Present State of Religiosity

Posted on February 6, 2012 by


Geographical and historical background

Even today, in spite of the westward expansion of Buddhism, Kalmykia remains the only ethnic Buddhist community in Europe. At present Kalmykia has a status of a republic with a presidential form of government within the Russian Federation. It is situated in the southeast of the European part of the Russian Federation in the territory of the Volga steppes. The population of present-day Kalmykia is about 330,000; of these Kalmyks comprise more than 50%, Russians around 30%, Chechens, Armenians and other minorities constitute the remainder. Ethnically the Kalmyks are of Mongolian origin; their language belongs to the Mongolian group of languages.

Buddhism began to spread among the Kalmyks in the 13th century A.D.[1] At that time the Kalmyks inhabited South Siberia and were known as the Oirats or West Mongols, comprising several ethnically and linguistically related tribes. The name kalmyk, which is a word of Turkish origin and means ‘remaining’, ‘separated’, was applied to the Oirats who in the 17th century migrated to Russia.[2]

When the Kalmyks became subjects of the Russian Empire, they brought Buddhism as their main spiritual tradition. Throughout the 17th century until the second half of the 18th century the Kalmyks had very close ties with Buddhist centers in Tibet and Mongolia. The religious policy of the Kalmyk khanate was conducted under the leadership of Tibet. However, at the end of the 18th century Russian Tsarina Catherine the Great prohibited any relations between the Kalmyks and Tibet. Kalmykia became isolated from other Buddhist centers, which had an impact on the development of Buddhism among the Kalmyks. Nevertheless, until the beginning of the 20th century the Kalmyks followed the Gelugpa school of Tibetan Buddhism.

From the 1930s to the 1980s Buddhism was persecuted by the Soviet government, and not a single prayer-house functioned in Kalmykia.[3] The most tragic event in the history of the Kalmyks was the deportation of 1943, when the entire population of Kalmykia was exiled to Siberia and Central Asia and the republic was abolished by the Soviet government. More than 40% of the exiled Kalmyks lost their lives during the years of deportation. Only in 1957 were the Kalmyks given the right to return to their home on the steppes of the Volga.

The Complexity of the Present Buddhist Revival

After almost a century of severe persecution of Buddhism by the Soviet government the traditional religious institutions of Kalmykia are being restored now. The first Buddhist community after the collapse of the Soviet Union was registered in October 1988; and since the beginning of the 1990s there has been a boom of religious revival in Kalmykia: temples (khurul)[4] have been built in almost every Kalmyk town, more and more Kalmyks receive Buddhist education, Buddhist teachers from abroad visit Kalmykia regularly, and pilgrims come to Kalmykia from all parts of Russia. However, as my fieldwork experience showed, the present situation of religious revival is very complex and differs greatly from the state of religiosity in Kalmykia before the Soviet period. The present Buddhist revival is much more than a restoration of only one Buddhist tradition. The complexity consists in the parallel development of several levels of Buddhism. Two levels of Buddhism are developing in Kalmykia now: the level of institutionalized Tibetan Buddhism and the level of folk religion; both levels are far from being homogeneous and can be further subdivided.

Community Revival. Picture by the author.

Tibetan Buddhism in contemporary Kalmykia

The Gelugpa tradition

Historically most Kalmyks belong to the Gelugpa school of Tibetan Buddhism, which is still the dominant religious tradition in Kalmykia. The first Buddhist temples and prayer houses opened in Kalmykia after 1990 belong to the Gelugpa order; and the overwhelming majority of monks in present-day Kalmykia adhere to the Gelugpa tradition.

At present the Gelugpa order in Kalmykia is centralized and interlinked: all Gelugpa monks and khurul in different regions of Kalmykia belong to the Kalmyk Central Buddhist Monastery Geden Sheddup Choskhorling. Therefore, the term ‘monastery’ in this case signifies a network of Buddhist temples and prayer houses functioning throughout Kalmykia.

The head temple of the monastery is The Golden Abode of Buddha Shakyamuni[5] or the Central Khurul as it is often called. It was constructed in only nine months of 2005 and now it is the largest Buddhist temple in Kalmykia and in Europe. The Central Khurul is an important cultural centre and a famous pilgrimage site in Kalmykia. The khurul has a center of traditional Tibetan medicine and a Buddhist library with a large collection of scriptures.

The head lama of the Kalmyk Centralized Buddhist Monastery and the Shadzhin Lama (the ‘Supreme’ Lama) of Kalmykia is Telo Tulku Rinpoche (Erdne Ombadykov), an ethnic Kalmyk and a citizen of the USA.[6] He was recognized by the 14th Dalai Lama as the 7th incarnation of Tilopa, the 11th century Indian yogi. The tradition of recognized reincarnations (tulku) was lost in Kalmykia already in the 17th century; therefore, the establishment of tulku is an innovation for Buddhism in Kalmykia, indicating a significant change in religious authority under the influence of Tibetan Buddhism. As a result, the head lama acquired additional power in the eyes of the laity: home altars of many Kalmyk lay believers also have images of Telo Tulku Rinpoche.

A need for trained monks is a serious issue for Kalmykia. At present there are 22 monks in the Central Khurul and about 20 monks working in other Gelugpa temples throughout Kalmykia. Most monks are neither Kalmyks nor Russians, but Tibetans, mainly from Tibetan exile communities. Nevertheless, new generations of Kalmyks receive their monastic education abroad, mainly in Tibetan monasteries in India. The usual place for the training of Kalmyk monks is Drepung Gomang Dratsang monastery in Karnataka (South India), which adheres to the Gelugpa school of Tibetan Buddhism.

Telo Tulku Rinpoche supports the tendency of unification of Buddhist practice and orientation towards the Tibetan Buddhist heritage and the Tibetan government in exile. It is obvious that Tibetan monks play a very important role in the contemporary Buddhist revival in Kalmykia. However, some Kalmyks believe that it is not the traditional ethnic Kalmyk religious heritage that is being revived in the republic at present. For many lay Kalmyks, especially for those of older generations, is it very important to see the restoration of the regional form of Buddhism that had developed in the Kalmyk steppes during the 17th – 19th centuries, which is regarded by many Kalmyks as different from other regional forms of Buddhism. Telo Tulku Rinpoche, however, refutes the notion of “Kalmyk Buddhism”, arguing that Buddhism as religion overcomes all ethnic and national borders and cannot be divided into Kalmyk, Tibetan or Mongolian variants.

Other Tibetan Buddhist schools represented in Kalmykia

The Nyingma stupa and temple. Picture by the author.

Apart from the Gelugpa order, other schools of Tibetan Buddhism are present in Kalmykia now. Of special interest are the Nyingmapa communities developing in Kalmykia now. Whereas the Kagyupas and the Sakyapas are represented in Kalmykia only on the level of Dharma centers, the Nyingmapa tradition functions on the level of khurul; which gives it additional importance in the eyes of believers.

In contrast to the Central Monastery, the Nyingma communities try to give Buddhism a Kalmyk flavor, which is very appealing for some Kalmyk laity (especially from smaller towns and villages). As Padma Sherab, the abbot of the first Nyingma khurul in Kalmykia and Russia, said, “Our community is a synthesis of the Tibetan Nyingma tradition and Kalmyk Buddhism”. The Kalmyk Nyingmapas position themselves as being much closer to lay people than the Central Khurul. All sutras and most ritual-texts used in the Nyingmapa khuruls have been translated into the Kalmyk language; so far they have been the only ones to use Kalmyk as ritual language in Kalmykia. As mentioned above, most monks in the Central Monastery are Tibetans and do not speak Kalmyk or Russian, although I was told that one of the main reasons for lay people to go to khurul is to discuss their problems with a lama or a monk. Some lamas even see themselves more as psychologists than ritual experts.

 

The role of the Kalmyk government and Kirsan Ilyumzhinov in the religious and cultural revival in Kalmykia

The present religious revival in Kalmykia is not just the result of missionary activities, but also the result of the governmental support. Of special importance is the role of the first president, Kirsan Ilyumzhinov, an eccentric and charismatic figure. He was first elected the president of Kalmykia in 1993 at the age of 31; at that time he was already a millionaire businessman, promising prosperity and development to the republic; he even refused to accept his salary of the republic’s president.  Ilyumzhinov occupied this post until 2010, having been reelected three times.[7]

Ilyumzhinov is popular with the Kalmyks for his support of all religions and of Buddhism in particular. Himself a devout Buddhist, he once mentioned in a television program that he may want to become a lama one day. Though the Constitution of the Russian Federation separates religion from the state, from 1993 to 1995 religion and church was declared by Ilyumzhinov an essential part of the state policy of Kalmykia. During these years a special Department for Religious Affairs functioned as executive agency subjected to the president of Kalmykia. Large subsidies were collected by the department and donated for the building of Buddhist temples as well as Christian churches; moreover, Ilyumzhinov sponsored the construction of temples and churches from his private funds. The first initiative to build the Central Khurul also belongs to the first president.

The Kalmyk culture-of-heroes approach to the leader has been employed in creating the image of the president. Kirsan Ilyumzhinov is perceived by many Kalmyks as a national long-awaited hero corresponding to the image of a leader in Mongolian legends and epic: young, charismatic, claiming to be of kinship with Chingis Khan, oriented towards spiritual development, supporting Buddhism and other religions. In spite of his authority, Ilyumzhinov is democratic in his attitude and accessible for common people.

Playing up to his image of a mythological ruler from a spiritual land, Ilyumzhinov became known outside Kalmykia and the Russian Federation for some of his sensational announcements. Thus, for example, in 1997 he openly confessed in a television programme that he had seen a UFO and had been kidnapped by aliens for a two-hour tour around their spaceship. Some Kalmyks I talked to during my fieldwork believe in Ilyumzhinov’s ability to see spirits and aliens, but most people that I had a chance to interview see it as the president’s unique sense of humour. Nevertheless, Kirsan Ilyumzhinov has been endowed with mythological properties and has become a near-cult personality in contemporary Kalmykia, he is even worshipped as bodhisattva by some Kalmyks.

 

The level of folk religion, “folk Buddhism” and the ancient cult of the White Old Man interpreted anew

The White Old Man statue. Picture by the author.

Besides schools of Tibetan Buddhism other Kalmyk religious traditions that are dynamically revitalizing at present can be referred to the level of folk religion. This level is not institutionalized; it is represented by religious experts (of both genders and of different ages) who perform various rituals for the benefit of the laity. In Kalmykia folk religious practices, beliefs and movements are often called “popular” or “folk” Buddhism, because they combine elements of Tibetan Buddhism with Oirat-Kalmyk pre-Buddhist, folk-religious spiritual traditions. Some scholars and representatives of the Kalmyk Buddhist clergy reject the notion of “folk Buddhism”, arguing that contemporary folk religious practices in Kalmykia have nothing in common with Buddhism and the teaching of Buddha Shakyamuni.

Kalmyk folk religious practitioners do not have monastic education, but receive knowledge and power from their guardian deities of Buddhist as well as pre-Buddhist origin. The most important deity for them is the White Old Man (Tsagan aava), a pan-Mongolian pre-Buddhist deity, the owner of the land and water, included in the Buddhist pantheon in Kalmykia with the function of a dharmapala, i.e. a defender of faith, in the 18th century.

The scope of practices of Kalmyk “folk Buddhist” ritual experts is very wide: they heal illnesses, tell fortune, have prophetic dreams, remove curses and bad luck, carry out love magic rites and calendar rituals. They use various methods and implements, ranging from Buddhist prayers to animal sacrifice depending on the individual practitioner.

It is difficult to state the exact number of folk religious practitioners in Kalmykia now because of their unofficial status. However, some ritual experts form communities. Thus, a community of ritual experts was registered in Kalmykia in 1999 under the name the Buddhist Community «Revival», though the application of the term Buddhist in this case is very debatable. The name “Revival” reflects the main aim, which is to revive traditions and ceremonies of the Oirat-Kalmyks and to restore the faith in the White Old Man. The cult of Tsagan Aava is seen by the community as the true ethnic Kalmyk spiritual heritage. The head and the founder of the community is a fifty year old Kalmyk woman, Galina Muzaeva. The community believes that Galina is Maitreya, the future Buddha; she is called the Bakshi (which means ‘teacher’) and all other members in this organization are her students.

The community largely draws inspiration from Buddhism as well: they venerate Buddhist deities, use Buddhist ritual objects, and perform rituals that traditionally have been conducted by Kalmyk Buddhist monks. The employment of Buddhist as well of Kalmyk folk religious elements attracts lay Buddhists to the activities of the community. However, Buddhist and traditional Kalmyk pre-Buddhist elements are mixed with new (at least for Kalmykia) ideas and aims that have nothing in common with Buddhism or shamanism. The final goal of the community is to unite the world religions and to create one faith in the White Old Man. Besides Buddhist deities, the community venerates Jesus Christ, Mother Mary and other Orthodox Christian saints. Thus, in the prayer house outside Elista, built in 2004, I saw images of Buddhist deities, the 14th Dalai Lama, Jesus Christ, Mother Mary and other Christian saints, a big poster of Prophet Muhammad and even a picture of the first president of Kalmykia, Kirsan Ilyumzhinov.

The old Mongolian cult of the White Old Man, however, has been reinterpreted, rather than revived by the community: Tsagan Aava is identified as the Highest Cosmic Intellect; therefore, this movement is also called “cosmic religion”. All ritual texts (numerous offering-prayers, healing prayers, etc.) the members of the community claim to have received telepathically from space in the “sun” language. The “sun” language is another invention of the community, which they believe to be “the sacred language of the White Old Man”. It is written in the Russian Cyrillic script and rhythmically may resemble Tibetan.

The community is actively involved in missionary activity, publishing books and a newspaper Maitreya. So far the community has published seven volumes of the cycle The Sacred Precepts of the White Old Man.  

 

Concluding remarks

In the context of Kalmykia it becomes rather problematic to use the word ‘revival’ with regard to religious and cultural developments; only if talking about a revival in a very broad meaning (as of religious activity in general). To what extent can these processes be called a revival? Buddhism in contemporary Kalmykia is not just revived but reinvented with new levels developing and new elements being added to what is believed to be “traditional Kalmyk Buddhism”. These new reinvented forms of Buddhism present a multifaceted material for ethnographic and anthropological research.
Valeriya Gazizova

PhD Candidate at the Faculty of Humanities (the Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages) at the University of Oslo Study Areas: Buddhism and folk religion in Tibet, Mongolia, Kalmykia, Buryatia and Tuva.

[1] However, there is another opinion that the Oirats came into contact with Buddhism as early as the end of the 10th century through the neighbouring peoples.

[2] One of the main motives of the Oirat exodus was internal feuding over a shortage of pasture land created by continuous subdivision of the feudal domains.

[3] In the beginning of the 20th century more than 100 monasteries with about 2000 monks were registered in Kalmykia. But after the prohibition of Buddhism all monasteries were destroyed, the majority of monks were arrested, some even murdered.

[4] In Kalmykia Buddhist monasteries and prayer houses are called khurul.

[5] Burkhn Bagshi Altn Syume

[6] Telo Tulku Rinpoche was born in 1972 in a family of Kalmyk immigrants in the USA and studied in Drepung Gomang Dratsang monastery in India for twelve years.

[7] In November 2010 Aleksey Orlov became the second president of Kalmykia. Nevertheless, political life in Kalmykia to a certain extent is still focused on the figure of Ilyumzhinov, though he is no longer the president.

Posted in Buddhism, Folk religion, Lamaism, religion | 1 Comment

China in Global Climate Change Politics

Posted on January 18, 2012 by

One of the paradoxes that COP17 left us with to solve is that of how to really understand China as a global climate change player. China has become more and more sure of herself both politically and economically  in any global setting. But when it comes to global climate change politics, we see a very careful and non-committing China. At home China is, however, doing quite a lot to transform the Chinese economy from brown growth to green growth as the recent five-year plan revealed as well as the figures for investments in renewables, where China is among the biggest investors in the world and leading in some technologies. Why is it then so difficult for China at the global stage to act more in accordance with national actions? The world would surely welcome it! More than that, the world expects it, and is not late to shame China for any failures in global negotiations as happened after the breakdown of COP15. Here, it is not so important whether or not China was to blame, the point is, that Chinese leaders were very surprised and had a hard time understanding this negative campaigning. At COP16 and COP17 it was clear that China had done a lot to prevent a similar negative campaigning. Chinese public statements about Chinese climate policies has since become very positive and open – but they still sound hollow as only national not global action is taken by China. And the world has become increasingly aware that other important players should also be held accountable for the lack of success in global climate talks; namely the USA, Canada, India and Russia.

Much of the confusion over China can be found in misperceptions over Chinese international policies and priorities. (Communist) China is still a relatively young actor in global politics, and on many issues, the Chinese position seems to be: leave domestic matters for ourselves to work out. A question of classic sovereignty as defined by Morgenthau. Chinese leaders make us believe that China is indeed a unitary actor. So when China is put under international pressure to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and commit to a global legally binding agreement, many fail to understand how fragmented China really is, and how difficult it is for China to undertake a needed transformation from a coal based to a sustainable economy.

And although climate change politics is one of the Chinese leadership’s main concerns, it is primarily a domestic concern related to three interlinked issues; energy security, sustainable economic development, and social stability and progress. China’s primary international concern is, however, to protect China’s sovereignty. Within China there are many diverging interests and understandings of climate change. Regions, cities, Chinese and foreign companies as well as NGO’s each play their different part in China’s economic, social, and environmental development. Officially these non-state actors cannot play a role in Chinese foreign policy, but they are still part of what frames the international understanding that China is becoming greener, because the green actors and the central government have an interest in showcasing their green development – thereby attracting investments or gaining other co-benefits such as better public health.

Other actors in the coal industry and the majority of the production economy dependent on cheap and accessible energy should also be taken into account. These actors protect their vested interests and fight against moving too fast from a brown to a green economy. And coal is still by far the largest energy source in China.

So there are many incentives for the Chinese leaders to present China as green and going green, but it is far harder to achieve, because of the fragmented domestic scene.

The major reason, however,  for Chinese lack of global commitment is that an eventual implementation of a global legally binding climate change agreement will clash with priority number one: sovereignty. And it will furthermore have enormous consequences for China’s role in the developing world.

In the global institutional framework being negotiated there is a pressure from most of the developed world, including USA and Canada, to agree on a global standardisation of how to measure and report GHG levels and reductions. The argument is simple and persuasive: If we don’t have the same measures globally we will not be sure that we’re doing enough – we won’t even be sure about what needs to be done. This principle is called MRV – Measure, Report, Validate – and this clashed with the Chinese understanding of sovereignty in such a degree, that China is fighting the principle of MRV with all means. The Chinese leaders all to vividly imagine what the consequences would be, if an international corps of GHG-controllers were allowed to enter China and validate the Chinese statistics with access to even the smallest coal plant and factory. This in itself is not so scary, but the dangers are many; Chinese statistics could be full of mistakes (deliberate or not), which would mean more international shaming, but the biggest danger is that the principle of the international community gaining access to China to validate progress on a certain policy area means that soon enough, human rights would be mentioned as the next area.

A different kind of consequence of a Chinese commitment to a global legally binding agreement is that of a change in definitions of equity. One of China’s main arguments against Chinese commitment is framed as common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) meaning basically that climate change is a global problem and common for all to share the burden, but the developed world must bare the biggest burden and do most since historically and per capita the developed world is more responsible, etc.

China is still aligned with the developing world on this issue. But if China really opened up for discussions on binding commitments, equity and CBDR would have to be reinterpreted; by asking if equity is the same for all developing countries – are there not a substantial difference between the small island states and e.g. China, which would then – more true to China’s economic size and growth rates categorise China as an emerging economy? It would split up the world in many more categories than just the developed and developing countries with a much more differentiated understanding of responsibility than is currently attached to the principle of equity and CBDR.

Furthermore, a China with a different global identity will probably lose her ability to act as a leader of the developing world in international forums like the UN. And China would lose her status as a developing country within the WTO, which would mean losing benefits of subsidies, the ability to keep tariffs. And maybe China would also be more easily pressured into letting the currency float. This is in this light we must understand Obama’s phrasing of China as a grown-up.

So for all these reasons and Chinese imaginations of “what could go wrong”, China is doing what is possible domestically but resisting a global legally binding agreement on fighting climate change.

Lau Blaxekjær
PhD Student
Department of Political Science
Copenhagen University

Posted in China, environment, International relations, politics, renewable energy | Leave a comment